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COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE CORPORATE
OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
PAT K. CHEWt
The corporate opportunity doctrine governs disputes that arise when
a corporate fiduciary pursues a business opportunity that the corporation
claims belongs to the corporation. Professor Chew identifies and evalu-
ates the competing policy interests triggered by these disputes, traces the
evolution of the corporate opportunity doctrine and examines the tradi-
tional tests and emerging models for resolving such disputes. Professor
Chew concludes that the traditional and emerging tests inadequately
protect legitimate individual and societal interests, and explains the im-
plications of this deficiency. Finally, Professor Chew proposes an alter-
native means for resolution of corporate opportunity disputes. She
recommends express negotiations between corporations and fiduciaries
on their respective rights, or, absent such negotiations, a heightened judi-
cial recognition of the parties' reasonable expectations in creating their
business relationship.
I. INTRODUCTION
Joe joined the corporation when it was just getting started.
Although he was not offered any stock ownership, he liked and
respected the family that owned the business. He had a hunch that he
could help build the corporation as well as learn more about the spe-
cialized electronics industry which he believed had promising poten-
tial. His hunch was correct. Over the next ten years, both the
corporation and Joe did well. Although the corporation remained
closely held by the family, it now had annual revenues above one mil-
lion dollars and was known in the industry as an established and relia-
ble business with talented management.
Joe was one of the main reasons the management's reputation was
so impressive. As vice-president of marketing, and as a director since
last year, Joe had learned the intricacies of the specialized electronics
market. He made it a point to follow technological developments,
reading avidly and participating in professional associations. He
thought these activities made good business sense, he enjoyed them,
and he thought they helped him develop professionally.
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Through professional meetings and reading journals, Joe followed
the work of different scientists, including a member of the engineering
faculty at the nearby university. He believed her work was creative
and showed promise. In fact, he had discussed with the corporation's
directors the idea of hiring her as a consultant for product innovation.
Despite Joe's efforts, the family members who controlled the corpora-
tion resisted the idea. They believed their traditional product line and
marketing approach had served them well in the past and would serve
them well in the future.
At a meeting of the regional professional association Joe was ap-
proached by the engineer. They discussed at great length her recent
invention. Joe recognized it as a significant product innovation in the
field. Aware of Joe's particular management and marketing talents,
she made him an exciting offer. She wanted to go into business with
Joe. Sharing equal equity and management control, she believed they
would be a perfect team for a successful new venture.
Joe faced a difficult decision. After weeks of soul searching, he
decided to pursue the entrepreneurial venture. While continuing with
his corporate responsibilities, he discreetly made preparations. After
giving the corporation reasonable notice, he departed.
After two years of hard work, his new company was beginning to
show a profit. Everything was going well until, like a bolt out of the
blue, Joe received a letter from counsel for his former corporation stat-
ing that the corporation claimed he had violated his fiduciary duty
under the corporate opportunity doctrine. The corporation was argu-
ing that Joe's company belonged to it. Joe was stunned. He believed
that he had been loyal to his former corporation, but he also believed
that he had a right to start his own business.
Disputes like the one described above are frequent in American business
life. In generations of cases, courts applying the corporate opportunity doctrine
have focused on the protection of the corporation's interest.1 The cases cast the
corporation as the surprised, vulnerable, and righteous victim of unscrupulous
directors and officers who succumb to their personal greed in derogation of their
proper corporate duties. A closer and more thoughtful analysis of actual corpo-
rate opportunity disputes and their consequences reveals that this picture is sim-
plistic and unrealistic. 2
1. Early United States cases include Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 140 (N.Y. 1863); Blal:e v.
Buffalo Creek R.R., 56 N.Y. 485 (1874); Steinway v. Steinway, 2 A.D. 301, 37 N.Y. Supp. 742 (1st
Dept. 1896), aff'd, 53 N.E. 1132 (1899). Other countries have recognized the corporate opportunity
doctrine only more recently. For a discussion of landmark cases in foreign countries and issues
raised, see Atkinson & Spence, Fiduciary Duties Owed by Departing Employees-the Emerging "Un-
fairness" Principle, 8 CAN. Bus. L.J. 501 (1983-84); Comment, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
in New Zealand, 5 OTAGo L. REv. 496 (1983). For a United States court's interpretation of the
Canadian corporate opportunity doctrine, see Messinger v. United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd., 486 F.
Supp. 788, 796 (D. Conn. 1980).
2. The author conducted a comprehensive analysis of corporate opportunity cases reported
between April 1977 and April 1988. The analysis is the basis for certain factual and analytical as-
sumptions about corporate opportunity disputes made throughout this Article.
The analysis revealed that these disputes usually occur in close corporations in a wide range of
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While the corporation has legitimate interests to protect, the outcomes of
corporate opportunity disputes also trigger legitimate and significant societal
and individual interests. Courts have recognized these interests in other areas of
law3 but surprisingly have not acknowledged them, except in a few cases, in the
corporate opportunity area. This tendency probably results from their not hav-
ing explored the actual consequences of corporate opportunity cases. This Arti-
cle argues the cost of continuing to ignore these consequences is too high.4
industries, frequently a family business or one started by friends. The defendants are traditional
corporate fiduciaries such as directors and officers, or, as is occurring more frequently, the defend-
ants are nontraditional fiduciaries such as key employees. The opportunities these individuals pur-
sue are often directly competitive to the corporation, which suggests that there may be significant
parallels between employment noncompetition laws and the corporate opportunity doctrine. The
analysis also indicated that courts are moving away from the traditional corporate opportunity tests
and gravitating toward the use of one or more new models to resolve disputes. These and other
findings are elaborated on in this Article.
There could be a variety of reasons for the paucity of litigated cases in publicly held corpora-
tions. First, the corporation and fiduciaries may have a prior understanding on resolving corporate
opportunity disputes. This understanding may be stated explicitly in an employment contract or in a
corporate policy statement. while provisions in these documents dealing with corporate opportuni-
ties per se would be unusual, provisions on noncompetition, use of corporate property, self dealing
transactions, and insider trading are not unusual. Disputes arising from these documents are more
likely to be viewed as breach of contract issues rather than corporate opportunity issues. In addi-
tion, the corporation and fiduciaries may have an unarticulated yet implicit agreement regarding
corporate opportunities that is enforced through industry and business practices rather than through
the courts. For example, the reputation of fiduciaries or corporations that engage in unacceptable
conduct regarding opportunities can be significantly harmed. In the tightly-knit circle of top level
fiduciaries in a given industry, harm to reputation is a powerful deterrent to undesirable conduct.
Another explanation for the paucity of litigated cases in publicly held corporations is that these
cases may be settled pretrial. Both parties are likely to be eager to resolve the dispute promptly and
to have ongoing legal counsel ready to move forward quickly with settlement negotiations.
Although close corporations and their fiduciaries are also eager to resolve disputes promptly, they
may have another agenda. Because of the close working relationships between the individual defend-
ants and plaintiffs, they may take the dispute more personally and be motivated "on principle" and
by a sense of betrayal to punish publicly or to prove definitively through the courts that their posi-
tion is correct. Since this personal intensity is less likely to exist in publicly held corporations, the
corporation may not even initiate a lawsuit. Finally, the opportunities of interest to a publicly held
corporation may be so large that individual fiduciaries would not have the resources to pursue them.
For an analysis of early corporate opportunity cases, see Brudney & Clark, A New Look at
Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1007-22 (1981).
3. Laws outside the corporate opportunity doctrine area consider competing interests when
both the employee and the corporation have an interest in the same opportunity or property. An
example is the laws governing ownership rights of inventions created by employees. CALIF. LAB.
CODE § 2870 (West Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 302 (Smith-Hurd 1986); see also
Coolley, Recent Changes in Employee Ownership Laws: Employers May Not Own Their Inventions
and Confidential Information, 41 Bus. LAW. 57 (1985) (describing recent cases and statutes on
employer versus employee ownership of inventions and confidential information). The laws gov-
erning trade secrets also consider the interests of the corporate user of the trade secrets, the employ-
ees, competitors of the trade secrets user, and broader societal interests. Robison, The Confidence
Game: An Approach to the Law about Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. 347, 354-63 (1983) (summa-
rizing competing interests in disputes over trade secrets).
4. Conclusions about societal costs and fundamental policy issues are based ideally on an anal-
ysis of both litigated and noniitigated corporate opportunity disputes. Reliance on only litigated
cases has limitations because they are not necessarily representative of all disputes and their resolu-
tions. For example, the litigated cases tend to be the close cases. See Cartwright, Disputes and
Reported Cases, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 369 (1975) (discusses problems in relying on reported cases).
Corporations and their fiduciaries may settle their disputes in a variety of constructive and creative
ways that take into account both their interests. Fiduciaries may return the opportunity to the
corporation in exchange for a return of capital and a reasonable return on their investment or the
parties may decide to develop jointly the opportunity. See also infra note 335 (discussing forms of
joint development).
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For example, the practical consequences for corporate fiduciaries are dras-
tic. In many instances fiduciaries who lose corporate opportunity lawsuits are
effectively prohibited from competing with their former corporations. This re-
sults even though the fiduciaries have not signed noncompetition agreements.
Such de facto restraints are contrary to individuals' rights to pursue freely their
interests and talents and to society's long-standing goal of promoting competi-
tion. This consequence is especially worrisome because the categories of individ-
uals subject to the doctrine, and hence subject to a prohibition against
competition, are expanding.5
In addition, the outcomes of corporate opportunity disputes can hinder the
creation of successful new businesses. This concern is particularly significant
because over the last two decades, small and medium sized companies have been
the largest source of economic growth in this country.6
The optimal goal is for promising opportunities to be successfully developed
without harming the corporation or disregarding the legitimate interests of fidu-
ciaries and society. The objective is to find societally constructive and coopera-
tive solutions to corporate opportunity disputes that enhance rather than hinder
the corporate-fiduciary relationship. 7 Yet the traditional corporate opportunity
tests, at least overtly, ignore noncorporate interests, For example, the "line of
business" test is the most widely cited traditional corporate opportunity test.3
Its key inquiry, as applied to Joe, is whether Joe's company is in competition
with the corporation. Since it probably is, Joe is precluded from pursuing the
opportunity and is deemed to have held the opportunity in trust for the corpora-
tion. This test and outcome clearly protect the corporation's interest. The test,
however, ignores policy concerns about Joe's and society's interests.
Some courts are moving away from the traditional tests and gravitating
toward one or more new models for resolving corporate opportunity disputes.
These models may be labeled as the corporate expectations model, the corporate
capability model, and the disclosure model. The corporate expectations model
resolves disputes based on what the corporation would reasonably expect to oc-
cur.9 As applied to Joe, if the corporation, in the court's opinion, would reason-
ably expect that the opportunity belongs to it, then Joe is precluded from
pursuing the opportunity. The corporate capability model focuses on whether
the corporation is able to develop the opportunity. 10 If it is not able, for
whatever legal, financial, or business reasons, then Joe may exploit the opportu-
nity. The disclosure model focuses on whether Joe discloses the opportunity to
5. See infra text accompanying notes 41-47.
6. D. BIRCH, JOB CREATION IN AMERICA: How OUR SMALLEST COMPANIES PUT THE
MOST PEOPLE TO WORK 6-16 (1987); see also infra text accompanying notes 48-64 (societal benefits
from the successful development of business opportunities).
7. For example, some form of joint development of the opportunity may be the most efficient
and mutually beneficial arrangement. See infra note 335 (discussing cooperative and joint develop-
ment of opportunities by the fiduciary and the corporation).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 67-82.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 187-225.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 140-86.
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the corporation, and the corporation's reaction to that disclosure.11 If Joe dis-
closes and the corporation consents, Joe may pursue the opportunity. Because,
in our example, Joe did not disclose the opportunity and his interest in pursuing
it, he violated his duty to the corporation and cannot continue his business.
These models have certain advantages. For example, the corporate capabil-
ity model promotes economic efficiency, and the disclosure model is reasonably
objective and monitorable. Like the traditional tests, however, they suffer from
a fundamental inadequacy: they do not directly consider individual or societal
interests. For example, the corporate capability model, while focusing on the
corporation's ability or inability to pursue the opportunity, does not consider
whether Joe may be especially, even uniquely, well suited to exploit the opportu-
nity successfully. The corporate expectations model studies the corporation's
expectations, neglecting the fact that Joe may also have what he considers legiti-
mate expectations of pursuing the opportunity. The disclosure model imposes
significant disclosure obligations on Joe, but does not inquire whether the corpo-
ration should have some reciprocal notice or disclosure obligations to Joe.
This Article offers a solution that accommodates both legitimate corporate
and noncorporate interests. It proposes that future disputes be resolved accord-
ing to the expectations of both the corporation and the fiduciaries. In the opti-
mal situation the parties will have an express agreement on how they expect to
resolve corporate opportunity disputes. In the absence of an agreement, the
courts should determine what their reasonable expectations would have been.
Thus, this Article is distinguishable from the existing legal literature in two
ways. First, it argues that the corporate opportunity doctrine should acknowl-
edge and protect legitimate individual and societal interests, as well as legitimate
corporate interests. Seemingly oblivious to noncorporate interests, courts and
other commentators instead have focused on the adequacy of the doctrine's pro-
tection of corporate interests.12 Second, the Article argues that corporate op-
portunity disputes should be resolved in ways that are consistent with the
reasonable expectations of both the corporation and the fiduciaries. This con-
ceptual framework is a departure from the current doctrine which predicates
liability on the basis of the defendants' fiduciary status and the protection of the
corporation's interest.
This Article begins with a discussion of the competing policy interests
found in corporate opportunity cases. It then studies the evolution of the corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine, including a review of the traditional corporate oppor-
11. See infra text accompanying notes 226-83.
12. Commentators offer various solutions for protecting the corporate interest. See Brudney &
Clark, supra note 2, at 1022-24 (categorical prohibition on full-time fiduciaries of public corpora-
tions); Note, Corporate Opportunity and Corporate Competition: A Double-Barreled Theory of Fidu-
ciary Liability, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1193 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Corporate Competition]
(advocating compliance with both the corporate opportunity doctrine and the employment noncom-
petition laws); Note, When Opportunity Knocks: An Analysis of the Brudney & Clark and ALI Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance Proposals for Deciding Corporate Opportunity Claims, 11 J. CORP. L.
255 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Opportunity Knocks] (advocating not only rejection of opportunity by
the board of directors but also unanimous shareholder consent before the fiduciary is allowed to
develop the rejected opportunity).
1989]
NOR TH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tunity tests and a thorough discussion of the emerging new corporate
opportunity models. Finally, the Article explores the proposed reasonable ex-
pectations model for resolving future corporate opportunity disputes.
IL COMPETING POLICY INTERESTS
The corporate opportunity doctrine should directly acknowledge and artic-
ulate the relevant corporate and noncorporate interests; as illustrated in Figure
1.13 Although this Article discusses the interests of the corporation, fiduciaries,
FIGURE 1. COMPETING INTERESTS
Corporate Interests






- protecting desire to pursue
interests and talents of choice




- protecting right to compete with
corporation (after tenure)
protecting right to confidentiality




- encouraging creation of successful
new businesses
- enhancing development of
entrepreneurial instincts and
activities
- permitting freedom to
contract
and society separately, they may share common concerns. For example, the
integrity of the corporate-fiduciary relationship, as described below, allows cor-
porations and fiduciaries to work in an atmosphere of trust and stability so that
13. There is some indication that the corporate laws governing other fiduciary duties are begin-
ning to recognize the legitimacy of noncorporate interests. Under the Pennsylvania statutes codify-
ing the duty of due care, for example, fiduciaries are expressly permitted to consider the effects 'of
their action upon employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation, and the communities in
which the corporation is located. These interests, however, are derivative-they are justified only in
determining the "best interests of the corporation." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363 (Purdon
Supp. 1988). The increased latitude and flexibility in the standard of the fiduciaries' duties also serve
the corporate interest because it enables corporations to attract directors and officers. See also Solo-
mon & Collins, Humanistic Economics: 4 New Model for the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate,
12 J. CORP. L. 331, 337-51 (1987) (proposing that the corporation redirect its goals from pure profit




they can direct their cooperative efforts toward the corporation's economic
productivity.
By openly discussing these different interests and their interrelationships,
courts, legislators, and commentators can define policy goals reflecting these dif-
ferent interests. As these policy goals are determined, empirical and other schol-
arly research can begin to identify what actually promotes the goals. For
instance, do rigid restrictions on fiduciaries' activities, regardless of the specific
circumstances, strengthen the integrity of corporate-fiduciary relationships?
This assumption apparently underlies the traditional trustee-oriented corporate
opportunity doctrine. Or, as argued later in this Article, are fairly negotiated
and clearly delineated rights and obligations of both the fiduciaries and the cor-
poration more likely to promote the integrity of the relationship?
A. The Corporate Interest
Two corporate interests are: (1) maintaining the integrity of the relation-
ship between the fiduciaries and the corporation, and (2) avoiding the direct
economic harm incurred when the corporation is deprived of an opportunity. 14
14. The corporation also may be concerned that prospective investors and shareholders will
lose confidence in the corporation because of their fear of the fiduciaries' possible diversion of oppor-
tunities. As their confidence diminishes, they will stop investing in the corporation and shift their
investment to other alternatives. Brudney & Clark, supra note 2, at 1028-30; ef Dooley, Enforce-
ment of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 48 (1980) (noting that investors may dis-
count the amount they will pay for shares due to the risk of insider trading); Wang, Trading in
Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who can Sue
Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. RFv. 1217,.1229 (1981) (questioning whether insider
trading activities influence investors' behavior). The legitimacy of this corporate interest, however,
is predicated on the improbable assumption that investors know and care about the corporate oppor-
tunity doctrine. Professors Elliott J. Weiss and Lawrence J. White demonstrate that these types of
assumptions can sometimes be tested. See Weiss & White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A
Study of Investors'Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 551, 566-67 (1987).
The corporation also has an interest in protecting what is clearly corporate property. In partic-
ular, the corporation is concerned that the fiduciaries will misappropriate intangible property such as
confidential proprietary information or trade secrets. Case law and statutes outside the corporate
opportunity area prohibit fiduciaries and other employees from using the corporation's proprietary
information or know-how improperly and provide remedies if misappropriation occurs. See, eg.,
Annotation, What Is "Trade Secret" So As to Render Actionable Under State Law Its Use or Disclo-
sure By Former Employee, 59 A.L.R.4TH 641 (1988) (cases determining what constitutes trade
secrets); see also Brudney & Clark, supra note 2, at 1009 (determining what constitutes corporate
resources). The corporation may also be concerned about misappropriation of tangible property.
For example, fiduciaries may develop an opportunity by improperly using tangible corporate prop-
erty such as office equipment, research facilities, supplies, or corporate personnel. Courts have cited
the relevance of the fiduciaries' use of corporate resources in their analyses of corporate opportunity
claims as a factor in assessing unfairness, bad faith, or in other tests for liability used in the jurisdic-
tion. See, eg., Banks v. Bryant, 497 So. 2d 460, 462-63 (Ala. 1986) (reimbursement for use of re-
sources not relevant); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch. 1985) (committee finding that no
corporate funds were used by directors when they purchased stock for themselves is not dispositive
as to whether a corporate opportunity existed), appeal denied sub nom. Fuqua Indus. v. Lewis, 504
A.2d 571 (Del. 1986); Graham v. Mimms, 111 Ill. App. 3d 751, 763, 444 N.E.2d 549, 557 (1982)
(fiduciary's use of corporate resources to develop a business opportunity for himself will not be
permitted); Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 302-03, 438 N.E.2d 391, 395
(1982) (even though the alleged trade secret was generally known, the trade secret issue retained
significance because the corporate opportunity doctrine deals with obtaining an opportunity);
Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 233, 240, 330 S.E.2d 649, 654, review denied, 314 N.C.
541, 335 S.E.2d 19 (1985).
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Because courts have long acknowledged corporate interests, they are discussed
more briefly than noncorporate interests.
1. Integrity of the Fiduciary-Corporate Relationship
Corporate fiduciaries are in positions of trust. In order to fulfill their gen-
eral responsibilities and make key decisions, they must have access to extensive
and confidential information. They also have significant decision making au-
thority to direct and implement major corporate policies. As representatives of
the corporation, they are in contact with individuals and entities, including sup-
pliers, distributors, and customers, that serve the corporation's operational
needs. Because of their corporate positions and activities, fiduciaries are exposed
to opportunities of interest to the corporation and of possible personal interest to
themselves.
The corporation relies on fiduciaries to fulfill their duties in good faith and
with integrity. The corporation provides them with access to information and
contacts so that the fiduciaries can perform effectively, not so that they can ex-
ploit these resources for their own personal benefit. Although individuals as-
sume fiduciary roles to serve their personal and professional objectives as well as
the corporation's needs, the corporation is concerned that these personal inter-
ests may conflict with corporate interests-that fiduciaries will allow their per-
sonal interests to overcome their corporate loyalty and will betray the
corporation's trust. The corporation does not want to have to speculate about or
monitor the fiduciaries' honesty and fair-dealing. It wants assurance that when
the fiduciaries make corporate decisions, those decisions are not tainted by per-
sonal interests.
2. Direct Economic Injury
A second corporate concern is the direct economic harm' s that the corpo-
ration suffers when deprived of a chance to develop the opportunity. This harm
is very difficult to determine, especially if there is no actual economic loss to the
corporation. The corporation could claim the loss of profits it would have re-
15. Although early courts did not analogize trust law and the remedy of the constructive trust
to the corporate opportunity doctrine to serve as a diversionary device, this analogy in more recent
court decisions has shifted the courts' attention away from the issue of how and to what extent the
corporation was harmed. The constructive trust remedy, unlike a damages remedy, is not based on
notions of harm but rather on principles of trust law. See, e.g., Graham v. Mimms, I 11 Ill. App. 3d
751, 763, 444 N.E.2d 549, 556 (1982). Few recent cases even mention harm. Compare Master
Records, Inc. v. Backman, 133 Ariz. 494, 497, 652 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1982) (in discussing both corpo-
rate opportunity and employment noncompetition doctrines, indicating that engaging in a competing
business is acceptable unless the fiduciaries deliberately cause injury to corporation) with Ampersand
Prods., Inc. v. Stahl, No. 85-4358 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Omni file)
(unjust enrichment of defendant rather than harm to corporation is the relevant concern).
Certain conditions would seem to increase the probability that the fiduciaries harmed the corpo-
ration. These conditions may relate to (1) the corporation itself (e.g., particular vulnerability be-
cause of depleted resources, disloyal customers, or financial instability), (2) the opportunity (e.g., the
opportunity is directly competitive with the corporation, the new company has a competitive advan-
tage (technological innovation, key talent, or strategic location), or the opportunity is not reasonably
easy to substitute), or (3) the geographic or product market in which the corporation is located (e.g.,
the market is limited and the opportunity was one of the few avenues for expansion).
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ceived if it had developed the opportunity. A determination of the difference
between the profits the corporation would have received if the fiduciaries had
not developed the opportunity and the profits the corporation actually received
would then be appropriate, although very difficult to ascertain. Whether the
corporation would have developed the opportunity, if the fiduciaries had not,
may be uncertain. Moreover, whether the corporation would have received the
same amount of profit as the fiduciaries actually received may be equally
speculative.
The corporation's argument for lost profits is most persuasive if the corpo-
ration's entitlement is based on a contract right to the opportunity. A contract
provides tangible evidence of the corporation's expectation of and reliance on
pursuing the opportunity. On the other hand, the argument for lost profits is
least persuasive if the corporation would not have had the capability to develop
the opportunity.16 It is difficult for the corporation to claim lost profits or other
economic injury from an opportunity that it could not actually have developed.
Furthermore, the corporation could not claim lost profits from a hypotheti-
cal sale of the opportunity to a third party who could develop it. Without sepa-
rate legal grounds on which to base the corporation's claims to the opportunity
(such as a contract right or proprietary intellectual property), the corporate op-
portunity doctrine could preclude only the fiduciaries, but not a third party,
from pursuing the opportunity. In other words, the corporation has no proprie-
tary interest to sell.
B. Individual Interests
The corporate opportunity doctrine as it is presently understood precludes
an express consideration of individual interests and rights.17 These interests
should be acknowledged and studied for at least three reasons: (1) the outcomes
of corporate opportunity disputes often have drastic consequences for the fiduci-
aries involved; (2) fiduciaries have legitimate rights and expectations regarding
the opportunities; and (3) the expansion of the number and categories of individ-
uals who are subject to and hence affected by the corporate opportunity doc-
trine. The following discussion explores individual interests in depth because
they have not been explored in this context before. While these individual inter-
ests are important, neither they nor societal interests should be given a presump-
tion of priority over corporate interests. This Article argues for consideration,
16. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1978) (analogizing corporate opportu-
nity doctrine to insider trading and considering whether the corporation was in a position to use the
opportunity as a measure of whether loss or harm to the corporation was possible). But see In re
Orfa Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1457 (D.N.J. 1987) (rejecting Freeman's analysis of insider
trading).
17. Courts direct attention to fiduciaries only to determine if they acted improperly, if their
conduct harmed the corporation, or if they learned of the opportunity in their personal or corporate
capacities. See Tuckman v. Aerosonic Corp., No. 4094 (Del. Ch. May 20, 1982) (LEXIS, States
library, Omni file); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978); Chemical Dynamics, Inc.
v. Newfeld, 728 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. App. 1987); Fender v. Prescott, 64 N.Y.2d 1077, 1078-79, 489
N.Y.S.2d 880, 880-81, 479 N.E.2d 225, 225-26 (1985).
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not domination, of noncorporate interests in corporate opportunity disputes.18
1. Consequences for the Fiduciaries
The outcomes of corporate opportunity lawsuits can have drastic effects on
fiduciaries' activities during their tenure as fiduciaries and upon their right to
compete with the corporation after their tenure. An understanding of these con-
sequences begins with a review of a typical fact pattern and the traditional rem-
edy in corporate opportunity cases. 19 In the typical fact pattern the fiduciaries
identify, investigate, negotiate, decide to pursue, and make preliminary plans for
the opportunity. They then resign their fiduciary roles, actively begin a compet-
ing business, and ultimately develop the opportunity into a profitable venture.
The fiduciaries usually have not signed noncompetition agreements.20
If the court deems the opportunity to belong to the corporation and the
fiduciaries breached their duty in taking it, the traditional remedy is a construc-
tive trust. A constructive trust recovers for the corporation not only the oppor-
tunity (principal), but all profits and any accruing appreciation (interest). This
remedy applies even though the fiduciaries may have made significant contribu-
tions of their time, talent, and personal funds to develop the opportunity, the
corporation may have actually benefitted from the opportunity, or the fiduciaries
did not benefit from the opportunity.2 1
The practical consequences of applying this remedy in the typical fact pat-
tern is that fiduciaries must give up their new businesses and are precluded from
18. If any interest is given priority, out of deference to past and current corporate opportunity
doctrine, the corporation's interest arguably should be given that status.
19. See author's analysis of cases, supra note 2. See, eg., United Seal & Rubber Co. v. Bunting,
248 Ga. 814, 815-16, 285 S.E.2d 721, 722-23 (1982); Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas Prods.
Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764, 467 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (1984); Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner,
282 Md. 31, 37-41, 382 A.2d 564, 568-70 (1978); Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass. App.
Ct. 296, 300-02, 438 N.E.2d. 391, 394-95 (1982).
20. Where there is a noncompetition covenant, some corporations have brought separate but
concurrent causes of action: the first based on the covenant and the second based on the corporate
opportunity doctrine. See, eg., Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957,
960 (Del. 1980); Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary Eng'g Corp., 246 Ga. 503, 504, 273 S.E.2d
112, 114 (1980); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Consistent Asset Management Co., No. 8867 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 25, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file). Thus, if the noncompetition covenant is not
enforceable or if the fiduciaries' objectionable conduct is beyond the scope of the covenant's terms,
the corporate opportunity doctrine may serve as an alternative theory for the corporation. The
existence, however, of the noncompetition covenant substantiates that the parties considered and
resolved the problem of competing opportunities. Imposing the corporate opportunity doctrine as
an alternative theory is inconsistent with the parties' expectations. The noncompetition covenant
should govern exclusively a dispute over the fiduciaries' taking of a competing opportunity, although
the corporate opportunity doctrine could be used if the corporation also is contesting the fiduciaries'
taking of a noncompeting opportunity. But see Note, Corporate Competition, supra note 12, at 1225
(recommending that both noncompetition law and the corporate opportunity doctrine should be
applied to every dispute, thus imposing the maximum restrictiveness on fiduciaries' activities).
21. RESTATEMENT OF REsTION §§ 190, 194 & 199 (1937); see also Farber v. Servan Land
Co., 662 F.2d 371, 380 (5th Cir. Unit B. Nov. 1981) (value of the land owned by the corporation
increased because the corporate land and the contested land were sold together); CST, Inc. v. Mark,
360 Pa. Super. 303, 310, 520 A.2d 469, 472 (fiduciary was respohsible for lost profits, even though
the fiduciary never received any profit), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 630, 539 A.2d 811 (1986). A few
cases use a damages remedy. See S.N.T. Indus. v. Geanopulos, 363 Pa. Super. 97, 105, 525 A.2d
736, 741 (1987) (damages plus a punitive award); BBF, Inc. v. Germanium Power Devices Corp., 13
Mass. App. Ct. 166, 176-77, 430 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (1982).
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competing with the corporation by virtue of that opportunity. Thus the remedy
afforded by the corporate opportunity doctrine effectively imposes upon fiducia-
ries a common law restraint on competing against their former corporation.
Although the doctrine permits fiduciaries to pursue commercial activities that
are not related to the original opportunity or not susceptible to another corpo-
rate opportunity violation, typically the opportunity is the integral foundation
on which the fiduciaries built the new business.22 Its transfer back to the corpo-
ration handicaps or effectively terminates the fiduciaries' business.
Although the corporation probably will reimburse the fiduciaries for the
price the fiduciaries paid for the opportunity, and the fiduciaries perhaps will
receive some "salary," they lose the appreciated value of the opportunity attrib-
utable to their entrepreneurial efforts, skills, and risk taking. In essence their
returns from the venture are based on an employee and not an equity status.
These former fiduciaries have lost the rewards of ownership-the prime reason
they were willing to undertake the considerable challenge and risks of starting
their own business. Instead they have involuntarily developed the opportunity
for the corporation.
This noncompetition restraint generally is imposed even though the fiducia-
ries resign from the corporation before opening the doors of their new busi-
ness.23 Thus, the doctrine restricts former fiduciaries even though their
fiduciary positions have terminated.24 Most courts have not addressed the effect
of the fiduciaries' resignation and presumably take for granted that the fiducia-
ries' resignation is not relevant.25
22. See, eg., Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics, 425 A.2d 957 (Del. 1980); Energy
Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass. App. 296, 438 N.E.2d 391 (1982); Production Finishing Corp.
v. Shields, 158 Mich. App. 479, 405 N.W.2d 171 (1987).
23. See, eg., Stagenberg v. Allied Distrib. & Bid. Serv. Co., No. 86-12-Il (Tenn. Ct. App. July
9, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file).
24. Id.; see infra note 25. Determination of when the duty begins presents a related issue. For
example, if directors are selected but have not begun their terms, and in the interim they learn of an
opportunity and begin to pursue it, the opportunity may become subject to the doctrine when the
fiduciaries' term begins, or courts may deem the opportunity to have come to the fiduciaries in their
individual capacities. Another consideration is whether the fiduciaries learned of the opportunity
before learning of their selection as directors.
25. Cases that have addressed the issue are divided. Compare Gregg v. United States Indus.,
715 F.2d 1522, 1541 (11th Cir. 1983) (once the defendant was removed as president, the corporate
opportunity doctrine was preempted since there were no fiduciary duties to trigger it), cert denied,
466 U.S. 960 (1984); Master Records, Inc. v. Backman, 133 Ariz. 494, 497-98, 652 P.2d 1017, 1020-
21 (1982) (en banc) (fiduciary duty terminates upon resignation); with Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk,
145 I11. App. 3d 355, 369, 495 N.E.2d 1006, 1011 (1986) (resignation does not terminate the duty
because the seed of the opportunity was planted prior to the resignation); Graham v. Mimms, 111
Ill. App. 3d 751, 765, 444 N.E.2d 549, 558 (1982) (same), cerL denied, 93 Il1. Rep. 2d 542 (1983);
Stangenberg v. Allied Distrib. & Bldg. Serv. Co., No. 86-12-I (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 1986)
(LEXIS, States library, Omni fie) (same). The court's determination of when the "seed" was
planted may be unclear but the opportunity's "seed" tends to be traced to an extenuated and unreal-
istic origin. See, ag., Comedy Cottage, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 360-61, 495 N.E.2d at 1011 (indicating a
seed has been planted whenever the opportunity is founded on information acquired during the
relationship, even though the information is not of trade secret status). Considering the wide range
of information about the corporation and industry to which fiduciaries are routinely exposed, it is
difficult to imagine any opportunity that could not be traced back to some general information the
fiduciaries acquired during their tenure. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05(b) comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1986) [hereinafter ALI Draft]
(duty arises only if corporate opportunity comes into existence during tenure as a fiduciary). Recog-
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Moreover, courts have assumed implicitly that fiduciaries may have
breached their duty even though only preparatory steps to starting the business
were taken during the fiduciaries' tenure, if those preparatory steps culminate in
exploitation of the opportunity.26 Prohibiting the fiduciaries' active competition
against the corporation during their tenure is consistent with basic principles of
the duty of loyalty.27 The corporate opportunity doctrine, however, also im-
pinges upon the fiduciaries' preparing to compete, making inquiries, and gather-
ing information. These activities may be tainted by the fiduciaries' ultimate
action of starting a competing business, and thus the doctrine exercises a chilling
effect on them.
In addition, some courts require that fiduciaries disclose the opportunity
and their interest in it to the corporation. 28 This mandate infringes upon fiduci-
aries' general right to keep their personal plans confidential until it is otherwise
necessary to give reasonable notice of their departure to the corporation. This
imposes on the fiduciaries' preparation for departure and violates the confidenti-
ality of their personal plans by forcing the fiduciaries to reveal their intent to
leave before they actually determine their future plans.
The inference from these cases is that fiduciaries who want to be certain
that they are not violating their fiduciary duties should quit their positions
before doing any investigating or preparing for other opportunities. While this
may be plausible for part-time fiduciaries such as outside directors, very few full-
time fiduciaries are in a position, except at great personal sacrifice, to take this
course of action.
2. Individuals' Legitimate Rights
The corporate opportunity doctrine assumes that fiduciaries are only enti-
tled to an opportunity by default; only if the corporation is not entitled to it can
they obtain the right to the opportunity.2 9 Fiduciaries, however, may have legit-
imate claims to the opportunity even from the outset. In the same way the cor-
poration does, the individuals may have an independent basis for arguing that
the opportunity belongs to them. If the opportunity belongs to the individuals,
then the corporation's exploitation of the opportunity actually would be an in-
fringement of the individuals' rights. Other areas of the law, such as the em-
ployment noncompetition area, acknowledge and legitimize the individuals'
rights in analogous circumstances.30 This basic idea, however, has not been rec-
ognized in the corporate opportunity area.
nizing that opportunities "germinate" over a period of time, the American Law Institute notes that
fiduciaries who resign during the germination period are subject to a duty to disclose only if it is
"fair" to the corporation to so disclose. ALI Draft, supra, § 5.05(b) comment, at 116.
26. Some courts scrutinize the fiduciaries' conduct, including any preparatory steps undertaken
prior to their departure from the corporation. E-g., Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass.
App. Ct. 296, 297-98, 438 N.E.2d 391, 392-93 (1982); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Or. 662, 683, 695
P.2d 906, 920 (1985) (en banc); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 728-30 (Utah 1982).
27. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 628 (3d ed. 1983).
28. See infra note 226.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
30. See supra note 3; infra note 304.
[Vol. 67
CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
One explanation for the lack of recognition of individuals' rights is histori-
cal. When fiduciaries were offered opportunities that might be of interest to their
corporation, courts originally equated their standard of conduct with that of
trustees.3 1 This analogy resulted in a rigid standard which strongly advocated
the strict liability of fiduciaries and, consistent with trust law, imposed the harsh
remedy of a constructive trust.32 Under trustee law principles, the rights and
interests of the beneficiary are exclusive.33
As the following discussion substantiates, however, the trustee-beneficiary
relationship is no longer (if it ever was) an appropriate standard for the fiduci-
ary-corporate relationship. 34 The fiduciary-corporate relationship is more
31. Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939); Hooker v. Midland Steel Co.,
215 Ill. 444, 451, 74 N.E. 445, 447 (1905); Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 164, 61 N.E. 163, 164
(1901); Blake v. Buffalo Creek R.R., 56 N.Y. 485, 491 (1874).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRusTEs §§ 543, 543(0), 543(V) (1960 & Supp. 1988). One commentator described the high
standards imposed on trustees:
A trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary of the trust to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiary. The trustee must exclude all self-interest, as well as the interest
of a third party, in his administration of the trust solely for the benefit of the beneficiary.
The trustee must not place himself in a position where his own interests or that of another
enters into conflict, or may possibly conflict, with the interest of the trust or its beneficiary.
Put another way, the trustee may not enter into a transaction or take or continue in a
position in which his personal interest or the interest of a third party is or becomes adverse
to the interest of the beneficiary.
G. BOGERT, supra, § 543.
33. See G. BOGERT, supra note 32, §§ 543, 543(0), 543(V).
34. The trustee analogy was predicated on certain fundamental assumptions about the human
nature of fiduciaries. Courts perceived fiduciaries as having the predilection, in the absence of any
legal restraints, to put their personal interests before those of the corporation. See Guth v. Loft, 23
Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939); G. BOGERT, supra note 32, § 543. To prevent such bad
faith actions, the courts decided to remove any temptation to misappropriate an opportunity belong-
ing to the corporation. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510.
Various studies suggest that the cause of misconduct is actually a corporate environment that
condones misconduct and unethical behavior, not the individuals' predispositions. Wartzman, Na-
ture or Nurture? Study Blames EthicalLapses on Corporate Goals, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1987, at 27, col.
4. See generally Frederick & Weber, The Values of Corporate Managers and their Critics: An Empir-
ical Description and Normative Implications in 9 RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE
AND POLICY 131, 147-50 (1987) (empirical inquiry into business ethics and values). Thus, the
trustee analogy may have been inappropriate.
One wonders if even the fiduciary iole is still appropriate for directors and officers.
Commentators have noted that fiduciaries in general have certain characteristics: (1) they
substitute for the corporation and shareholders, (2) they receive their power from the cor-
poration and shareholders, and (3) they have access to much more information than the
shareholders.
Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: TIVE STRUCTURE OF
BUSINESS 55, 77 (1985); Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 808-09.(1983). These
characteristics both confirm the fiduciaries' positions of trust and make their potential abuse of dis-
cretion more probable. Clark, supra, at 77; Frankel, supra, at 808-09; cf Sheperd, Towards a Unified
Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REv. 51, 75 (1981) ("a fiduciary relationship exists
whenever any person receives a power of any type on condition that he also receive with it a duty to
utilize that power in the best interests of another, and the recipient of the power uses that power");
Seigel, The New Fiduciaries: Some Observations on the Imposition of Extra-Contract Duties in Con-
sumer Transactions (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussing evolution of different
types of fiduciary duties).
Yet most.litigated corporate opportunity disputes occur in close corporations. See supra note 2.
In these entities, directors, officers, key employees, and shareholders are often the same people. A
close identity thus exists between the fiduciaries and the corporation. In a practical sense, the com-
mon characteristics of fiduciaries described above do not exist. The fiduciaries instead are essentially
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analogous to an agency, employee, or partnership relationship in which both
parties have recognized the duties and rights of the other and such rights and
duties are flexibly negotiated. 35 When the corporation and the fiduciaries enter
into their relationship, they are concerned about protecting their own interests
but acknowledge the existence and importance of the other party's interests.
Neither party can afford to underestimate the other's bargaining position. Indi-
viduals who are being considered for director, officer, or key employee positions
possess attributes such as experience, talents, or economic resources that are
highly valued by the corporation. These individuals also are likely to have other
options in which to invest their resources or talents. The corporation likewise
has attributes such as institutional resources and status that are attractive to
prospective fiduciaries. Both parties are in positions to negotiate terms in their
own best interests. Hence, their agreements, including agreements concerning
corporate opportunities, are likely to reflect both their interests.
Their explicit agreement 36 typically is for the corporation to give a tangible
compensation package (specified salary and other benefits) in exchange for the
fiduciaries' satisfactory performance of designated responsibilities. 37 Fiduciaries
do not ordinarily assign to the corporation 100 percent of their energies, time,
efforts, and cumulative talents; they are not on call twenty-four hours a day.
Corporations do not realistically expect that. Otherwise, for example, outside
directors who serve in a fiduciary capacity in several corporations could not
possibly fulfill their obligations.38 Fiduciaries instead agree to utilize all the en-
ergies, time, efforts, and talents necessary to perform properly one hundred per-
representing themselves and endowing themselves with the expansive power they need to carry out
their responsibilities. Furthermore, they have no more information than other key participants.
Rather than the corporation giving them access to information, they are as likely to have created or
compiled that information themselves.
35. See Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 962 (Del. 1980)
(advocating the use of agency principles); Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 37-38, 382
A.2d 564, 568 (1978) (advocating the use of employment law principles).
36. According to one survey, 48% of the 560 largest U.S. companies have written agreements
with their high-ranking employees. Stickney, Settling the Terms of Employment, MONEY, Dec.
1984, at 127. Information on the frequency of written employment agreements in small close corpo-
rations is unavailable, but it is probably a common practice for corporations receiving legal advice.
37. In addition to salaries, directors and executives of large, publicly-held corporations receive
other benefits including stock option plans, deferred compensation, life insurance, and severance
arrangements in the event of takeovers. McMillan & Bruno, Bulls, Bears, and Bureaucrats-Major
Forces Shaping Executive Compensation, FIN. EXECUTIVE, May 1983, at 23-24. The average cash
compensation that outside directors received in the largest 100 industrial corporations in 1986 was
$32,924. Id.; HEwrrT Assoc., HIGHLIGHTS OF COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR OUTSIDE DI-
RECTORS IN THE FORTUNE 100 INDUSTRIALS 5-6 (Sept. 1987). Information on the compensation
arrangements in close corporations is not available.
38. Both part-time (outside directors) and full-time fiduciaries are multifaceted, with many
roles other than the one with the corporation. They may be active in professional associations, be
leaders in community and political activities, and have significant family commitments. Pursuing
economic and business activities in addition to their corporate activities does not necessarily mean
that they are disloyal. Without using corporate resources or time, they may develop their own
investment portfolio, create and patent inventions, and write and copyright valuable publications.
Fiduciaries are even capable of serving as fiduciaries to more than one enterprise. Despite the
increasing prevalence of individuals assuming multiple fiduciary roles, the corporate opportunity
doctrine has not fully addressed how to resolve the resulting problems. For example, if an opportu-
nity is deemed to belong to more than one of the corporations the fiduciary serves, the determination
of which corporation has the priority right to the opportunity remains uncertain. ALI Draft, supra
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cent of the job or function they have accepted. 39 They have not bargained away
their individual skills, general experience, and ingenuity unless they have ex-
pressly agreed to do so. Fiduciaries believe that they retain the privilege to com-
pete with the corporation in the future and to prepare for such competition
while they are with the corporation. Fiduciaries certainly do not believe that
they have waived all rights to opportunities in which the corporation also may
have some interest. 40
3. Increasing Number of Individuals Affected
A final reason that the individual's interest should be included in an analy-
sis of the corporate opportunity doctrine is that the number of individuals who
may be subject to the corporate opportunity doctrine is increasing. This expan-
sion is attributable to an interaction between legal and business developments.
To begin, the number of situations implicating the corporate opportunity
doctrine is increasing. Businesses are becoming more diversified and, conse-
quently, the opportunities in which they may have some interest, expectancy, or
capability are increasing. Meanwhile, fiduciaries are becoming increasingly well
educated; they are multifaceted individuals who are exposed to and interested in
diverse ideas and opportunities. The proliferation of professional meetings, jour-
nals for every conceivable professional specialty, and telecommunication sys-
tems allowing an extensive and instantaneous horizon of contacts and ideas
enhance innovative thinking and the generation of entrepreneurial ideas. Fi-
note 25, § 5.05(a) comment, at 111 (suggesting that fiduciaries offer the opportunity to and receive a
rejection from each corporation).
In addition to the issue of conflicting loyalties, there is also the possibility that the fiduciary will
be subject to differing standards of conduct. Consider an individual who is a fiduciary with a busi-
ness corporation, a partnership, and a bank. An opportunity arises that may be of interest to each
entity and to the individual fiduciary. While the corporate opportunity doctrine governs the fiduci-
ary's conduct toward the corporation, the partnership opportunity doctrine and applicable banking
laws govern the fiduciary's conduct toward the other entities. Thus, the fiduciary faces the difficult
task of discerning what each law stipulates and, if required, to act differently with each entity. See
also R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 253 & n.1 (1986) (discussing fiduciary's possible disclosure obli-
gations to different corporations); Brudney & Clark, supra note 2, at 1044 (suggesting that consent,
presumably of each corporation, be obtained). Note, Opportunity Knocks, supra note 12, at 258 n.26
(noting inadequacy of line of business test when there are multiple fiduciary roles); For recent cases
on the partnership opportunity doctrine, see Mathis v. Meyeres, 574 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1978); Dixon
v. Trinity Joint Venture, 49 Md. App. 379, 431 A.2d 1364 (1981). For recent cases discussing the
fiduciary standards regarding "corporate" opportunities imposed on directors of financial institu-
tions, see United States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of La Marque,
Tex. v. Smith, 436 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 610 F.2d 1258
(5th Cir. 1980); Valiquet v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 87 Ill. App. 3d 195, 408 N.E.2d 921
(1979); Warren v. Century Bankcorp., 744 P.2d 846 (Okla. 1987). See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 555.17,
571.9 (1988) (regulations governing usurpation of corporate opportunities of federal savings and loan
institutions).
39. Depending on the job duties, the satisfactory performance of one's professional responsibili-
ties may require 100% of one's total energies, time, and talent. This is the rare case, however, and is
presumably an arrangement voluntarily and knowingly entered into by the fiduciaries.
40. "Is it necessary, considering all the circumstances, to impose a disability upon officers in the
position of the defendant to secure a proper performance of their function within the corporate
business?" Note, Fiduciary Duty of Officers and Directors Not to Compete With the Corporation, 54
HARV. L. RaV. 1191, 1195 (1941).
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nally, the fast pace of technological development and the increasing concern
with industrial productivity provide fertile ground for more opportunities.
In part because of these developments, businesses have moved away from
traditional management structures in which a few clearly designated individuals
make all the important decisions. In these traditional structures, it was indispu-
table who the directors and officers were and hence who was subject to fiduciary
duties such as those imposed by the corporate opportunity doctrine. Today indi-
viduals on various management levels have access to confidential information
and possess significant decision making authority. Given these circumstances, it
is not surprising that the courts have not resolved fully either who is subject to
the doctrine or how that determination will be made.
Clearly, as a result of these business and management developments, the
categories of individuals potentially subject to the doctrine are expanding. For
example, various courts have found key employees 4 1 and majority sharehold-
ers42 subject to the doctrine. Several cases decided in Georgia illustrate the diffi-
culty of these issues. In determining whether a chief engineer was subject to the
state's business opportunity statute, the supreme court concluded that the law
was applicable to directors and officers but not to "typical employees."'43 It im-
plied, however, that individuals other than directors and officers might be sub-
ject to the law if they were in fiduciary positions. The court did not elaborate on
what constituted fiduciary status.44 A later Georgia case held that the statute
should be read literally to apply only to directors and officers.45 The holding,
however, was expansive in its application. A vice-president of sales, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, was presumed to be an "officer" and hence
subject to the statute.46
41. See Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 962 (Del. 1980);
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Consistent Asset Management Co., No. 8867 (Del. Ch. March 25, 1987)
(LEXIS, States library, Omni file); Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39-40, 382 A.2d
564, 568-69 (1978) (court did permit employee certain preparation privileges while he was contem-
plating a different job).
42. See Banks v. Bryant, 497 So. 2d 460, 465 (Ala. 1986) (per curiam); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396
A.2d 512, 519-20 (Del. Ch. 1978).
43. Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary Eng'g Corp., 246 Ga. 503, 506, 273 S.E.2d 112, 116
(1980).
44. Id.; Walter E. Zemitzsch, Inc. v. Harrison, 712 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Mo. App. 1986) (defend-
ant was not a fiduciary subject to the doctrine because he did not have access to confidential informa-
tion and had limited authority).
45. Sofate of Am., Inc. v. Brown, 171 Ga. App. 39, 39-42, 318 S.E.2d 771, 775 (1984). That
court suggested that courts look to the corporate minutes to determine who are the officers. Id. at
42, 318 S.E.2d at 776. This indicates that directors may determine who the fiduciaries are merely by
designating these individuals in the minutes as corporate officers.
46. The American Law Institute (ALI) has proposed definitional guidelines for determining
who is subject to the doctrine. In addition to the traditional fiduciary roles of directors and officers
designated under state corporate law statutes, the guidelines include the chief operating officers,
heads of principal units or functions, and those performing a major policy making function. ALI
Draft, supra note 25, §§ 1.22(a)-(b), 1.28, 5.05(a), 5.12 (regarding dominating shareholders). While
useful as a beginning, these guidelines may be difficult to apply to small, informal close corporations.
In that setting there are often numerous "bosses" and few typical employees, and formal and accu-
rate designations of authority are infrequent. Eg., Tulumello v. W.J. Taylor Int'l Const. Co., 84
A.D.2d 903, 903, 446 N.Y.S.2d 673, 697 (1981) (employee had an officer's title, but the court de-
cided his fiduciary status was in name only and hence he was not subject to the doctrine); Lowder v.
All Star Mills, Inc., 82 N.C. App. 470, 472, 346 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1986) (defendant did not have a
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The extension of the corporate opportunity doctrine to nontraditional fidu-
ciaries raises several issues. First, courts are more likely to conclude that key
employees are subject to the doctrine and its restrictions if those employees have
been endowed with more trust and responsibility (as suggested by access to con-
fidential information and increased authority) and have invested significantly in
the corporation (as suggested by their years with the corporation and an equity
interest). Given this judicial propensity and a desire to avoid restrictions on
their activities, employees may be hesitant to accept more trustworthy positions
or to increase their corporate commitment. This result seems contrary to policy
interests, which would be better served if individuals were rewarded rather than
penalized for their increasing corporate roles and responsibilities.
Second, the evolving distinction between key employees who are considered
fiduciaries and those who are not creates uncertainty for individuals with major
corporate responsibilities. Many of these individuals are no doubt unaware that
they may be subject to the corporate opportunity doctrine. This lack of notice is
especially significant because of the disparity between the standard of conduct
for nonfiduciaries and the standard for fiduciaries. 47 In light of the potential
consequences for key employees, corporations arguably should have a duty to
inform those employees when the corporation considers them to be fiduciaries
subject to the corporate opportunity doctrine.
C. Societal Interest
The outcome of corporate opportunity disputes may influence important
societal goals including the goals of creating new businesses, of promoting com-
petition, and of enhancing the freedom to contract.4 8 The prior discussion of
formal title but was nonetheless considered a de facto officer). A similar problem arises under § 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; courts have struggled with the definition of who is an "of-
ficer" under that statute. Eg., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566 F.2d
1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1978); Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
47. If individuals are considered mere agents, they are prohibited under general agency princi-
pies only from pursuing opportunities that are within the scope of their agency. Clark, supra note
34, at 68-71. They may pursue opportunities outside this scope, even if that results in their competit-
ing with the corporation. Levy & Surrick v. Surrick, 362 Pa. Super. 510, 524 A.2d 993, 995 (1987),
allocatur denied, 538 A.2d 877 (1988); see also Clark, supra note 34, at 68-72 (discussion of agency
principles). If the individuals are considered typical nonfiduciary employees, courts may permit
them to compete with their former corporation as long as they have not executed noncompetition
covenants. See infra note 304; see also ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(b) comment illus. 4 (higher
standard regarding inventions for certain fiduciaries than for other employees).
48. The possibility of corporate opportunity prosecution may preclude fiduciaries from culmi-
nating or implementing agreements with a third party, even though the third party refuses to pursue
the opportunity with the corporation. Thus, the application of the corporate opportunity doctrine
may impinge not only on the fiduciaries' but also on the third party's freedom to contract. This
result may occur even if the fiduciaries' preclusion from participating violates the fiduciaries' binding
obligation under the agreement with the third party. See, eg., Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker,
154 I11. App. 3d 61, 71, 506 N.E.2d 645, 652 (1987) (court ordered accounting of profits by fiducia-
ries in outside venture to be held in constructive trust for corporation); Comedy Cottage, Inc. v.
Berk, 145 Ill. App. 3d 355, 362, 495 N.E.2d 1006, 1012 (1986) (upheld injunction against fudiciary's
lease with third party on grounds the lease interfered with the corporation's interest in a lease re-
newal); Energy Resources Corp., v. Porter, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 300-02, 438 N.E.2d 391, 394-95
(1982) (fiduciary owes damages to the corporation even though grant money already paid to fiduci-
ary by United States Department of Energy).
1989]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
individual interests reveals how the outcome of corporate opportunity cases may
effectively preclude fiduciaries from developing competing businesses. Spin-off
businesses from close corporations in diverse industries appear to suffer special
harm.49 This restraint on individuals' freedom to compete is contrary to soci-
ety's long-standing goal of promoting competition.
Moreover, the right to start a new business based on an innovative product,
a new management approach, or an unmet market niche is an integral part of
our capitalist system. The promotion of entrepreneurship is justified considering
the contributions it has made to this country. Over the last two decades, small
and medium sized companies created more new jobs than any other sector in the
economy, serving as the largest source of economic growth.5 0 While many new
businesses are not based on a technological innovation, much technological in-
novation has come from new firms.5 1 Furthermore, the importance of entrepre-
neurship promises to increase in the future. Both academia and government
recognize the role of entrepreneurship in enhancing American competitiveness
in the global economy.52
Despite the importance of entrepreneurship, the corporate opportunity doc-
trine does not explicitly take it into account. This omission is explained in part
by a lack of understanding of how the results in corporate opportunity cases and
entrepreneurship are related. The following section discusses how these results
may (1) decrease the number of business opportunities that are successfully de-
veloped and (2) systematically discourage fiduciaries' entrepreneurial instincts.
1. Successful Development of Opportunities
If outcomes of corporate opportunity lawsuits generally deny opportunities
to fiduciaries, 53 the number of entrepreneurial ventures that succeed will de-
crease because fiduciaries as a class arguably have a higher probability of suc-
cessfully exploiting opportunities than others who may seek to develop the
opportunities.5 4 For instance, fiduciaries have a higher probability of success-
49. See supra note 2.
50. D. BIRCH, supra note 6, 6-16 (substantiating that the formation and expansion of firms with
fewer than 20 individuals have created virtually all U.S. net employment gains since 1981); P.
DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1-11 (1985); see P. STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 24-25 (1983).
51. Spanner, Trade Secrets Versus Technological Innovation, TECH. REV., Feb. 1984, at 12.
52. Executive Order No. 12,591, 3 C.F.R. 220 (1987) (implementing Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (1985)) (creators of technology may euct
to retain title to government-funded inventions); P. Jones & D. Treece, Research Agenda on Compet-
itiveness" A Program of Research for the Nation's Business Schools (Internat'l Bus. Working Paper
No. IB-7, April 1987, Berkeley Business School).
53. Denial of the corporate opportunity to fiduciaries is not an improbable outcome. Some
commentators argue for a rule categorically denying opportunities to certain fiduciaries. Brudney &
Clark, supra note 2, at 1023. In addition, courts denied the corporate opportunity to approximately
50% of the defendants in the cases surveyed in the author's research.
54. In addition, precluding fiduciaries from exploiting opportunities will decrease the absolute
number of opportunities developed. At first glance, one might assume that all attractive opportuni-
ties that are denied to fiduciaries will be exploited by either the corporation or random third parties.
Although they may not be as successful at developing the opportunities as fiduciaries, there will at
least be attempts to exploit these opportunities. The denial of the opportunities to fiduciaries, how-
ever, could result in a certain number of opportunities simply going untapped. For example, the
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fully developing the opportunity than random third parties 5 5 Individuals gen-
erally become fiduciaries because of their past business successes. Their current
fiduciary positions suggest that they have the personal attributes, incentives,
skills, and experiences to increase the probability of achieving another business
success.5 6 Furthermore, fiduciaries often pursue opportunities in the same in-
dustry or directed toward the same target market, applying their cumulative
business acumen to the new opportunity and thereby increasing its probability
of success. Random third parties do not have the same advantages.
Assuming that both the corporation and the fiduciaries have adequate fi-
nancial resources to pursue the opportunity, fiduciaries, in certain circum-
stances, have a higher probability of successfully developing the opportunity
than the corporation. This likelihood is particularly true if the opportunity deals
with a product or market innovation. Bringing an innovation from the idea
stage to successful commercialization is a long, arduous, and risky process.5 7
Evidence suggests that an individual's more flexible start-up operations can
manage the process more effectively than a more structured corporation.58
The established corporation has standardized procedures, policies, and a
corporate bureaucracy that impede accommodation of the novel problems inevi-
table in the entrepreneurial process. The corporation's tendency is to make the
new opportunity fit existing operations. In addition, the corporation's attempt
to accommodate the entrepreneurial process may significantly disrupt the ongo-
ing operations. The more unrelated the opportunity is to the corporation's cur-
rent product lines and business activities, the less likely the corporation will be
able to exploit successfully the idea.5 9 In contrast, fiduciaries create start-up op-
erations to develop the innovative idea; they have no established bureaucracy.
Their management is flexible because they do not yet follow established policies
for committing their resources. They can therefore accommodate the changing
demands of a developing product and tailor optimal solutions from a broader
particular fiduciaries might have a particular competitive advantage, such as unique skills or exper-
tise, that would make an opportunity profitable for the fiduciaries but not for others. Or the fiducia-
ries may originate an idea that others could exploit, but the fiduciaries do not disclose it to anyone
else. Even if courts would deem an opportunity belongs to the corporation, the corporation may
decide not to exploit it. The corporation, for example, may not have the capability for exploitation
or the opportunity is not compatible with its current policy and strategy. The corporation may keep
the idea confidential, even though it will not exploit the opportunity, thereby preventing a third
party, such as a competitor, from learning of and developing it.
55. Current fiduciaries would have fewer advantages over past fiduciaries of the corporation or
fiduciaries of other corporations in the same industry. Only a limited number of individuals, how-
ever, would have both comparable expertise in the particular industry or market and a desire to
pursue a given opportunity.
56. The best predictor of future business success is past business success. Owens, Background
Data in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 609, 640 (M. Dunnette
ed. 1976). This prediction assumes that fiduciaries receive their fiduciary positions on the basis of
professional achievements and talents. If this is not the case, if for instance fiduciaries received their
positions because of family affiliation, then their current fiduciary status may not be as predictive of
future success.
57. E. MANSFIELD, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 99-133 (1968).
58. P. DRUCKER, supra note 50, at 141-206.
59. See generally Williams, Paez & Sanders, Conglomerates Revisited, STRTEGIC MGMT. J.,
Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 403 (documenting trend of conglomerates to divest unrelated businesses because
diversification was unsuccessful).
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range of options.6 °
2. Development of Entrepreneurial Instincts
Economists have long recognized the critical role that the entrepreneurial
element plays in commercial activities. 61 Individuals with entrepreneurial in-
stincts and skills are alert to information and experiences, and consequently see
opportunities that others do not notice. By questioning current perceptions and
using a keen sense of discovery, these individuals recognize ways in which re-
sources can be shifted from low productivity to high productivity. Fiduciaries'
exposure to critical information, their business background, and their broader
corporate perspective provide fertile ground for the cultivation of their en-
trepreneurial instincts.
The corporation reasonably expects its fiduciaries to be alert to en-
trepreneurial opportunities on the corporation's behalf. This expectation may be
an explicit or implicit part of their employment arrangement. Some en-
trepreneurial opportunities, however, arguably are outside the corporation's sole
prerogative. A judicial tendency to deny corporate opportunities to fiduciaries
who have legitimate claims to these opportunities would gradually discourage
fiduciaries from cultivating entrepreneurial instincts and skills in general. Con-
sequently, opportunities that might have led to great benefit for corporations and
society would go unnoticed by fiduciaries who have not developed sensitivity to
potential opportunities. 62
These negative consequences require consideration in light of both the cor-
poration's and the fiduciaries' rights.63 Opportunities clearly belonging to the
corporation should not be given to fiduciaries as a form of management compen-
sation.64 Opportunities to which both the fiduciaries and the corporation have
legitimate interests, however, should not be deemed automatically to belong to
the corporation. A satisfactory corporate opportunity doctrine must recognize
and accommodate the competing interests of fiduciaries and corporations, in or-
60. A hypothetical case illustrates how one entrepreneur consciously managed his company to
create employee commitment and trust. G. SHEA, COMPANY LOYALTY: EARNING IT, KEEPING IT
37-41, 44 (1987).
61. See P. DRUCKER, supra note 50, at 31-75; I. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP 31-74 (1973); E. MANSFIELD, supra note 57, at 27.
62. In addition, individuals may decline fiduciary roles altogether rather than forsake the possi-
bility of entrepreneurial ventures. See also supra text accompanying notes 46-47 (discussing how
applying doctrine to nontraditional fiduciaries may discourage key employees from accepting fiduci-
ary positions).
63. Discouragement of entrepreneurial activities imposes an additional societal cost. Studies
have indicated that individuals' entrepreneurial activities, such as information gathering and
networking experiences outside the corporation, lead to a diffusion and a cross pollination of innova-
tive ideas. This, in turn, may lead to technological breakthroughs of enormous importance. E.
MANSFIELD, supra note 57, at 110-30; Ettlie, The Impact of Interorganizational Manpower Flows on
the Innovative Process, MGMT. Sci., Sept. 1985, at 1055, 1055-71. Some of these breakthroughs may
never occur, however, if fiduciaries do not have the incentive to engage in these entrepreneurial
activities.
64. This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion that the use of inside information for
personal advantage should not be viewed as part of management's compensation. Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961).
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der to serve successfully the societal goals of enhancing competition and promot-
ing entrepreneurship.
III. TRADITIONAL TESTS REvISrED
The prior section substantiated that corporate opportunity cases trigger not
only corporate interests, but also legitimate individual and societal interests.
The following review of traditional corporate opportunity tests65 confirms that
these tests do not adequately acknowledge noncorporate interests.
While the tests are predicated on a single concern-the protection of the
corporate interest-a survey of the tests discloses diverse approaches serving
that concern. The tests discussed here and summarized-in Table 1, are the line
of business test, the expectancy test, the fairness test, and the Miller two-step
test.66 The following discussion elaborates on the landmark cases, their key in-
quiries, and the ways in which they consider various factors. Variations among
the tests are attributable in part to the different presumptions the courts make
about the human nature of fiduciaries. These, in turn, shape their determination
of how restrictive the limitations on fiduciaries' activities should be.
A. Line of Business Test
The most cited and prominent case in the corporate opportunity area is
Guth v. Loft, Inc. 67 In Guth the Delaware Supreme Court tied the principle that
corporate fiduciaries are analogous to trustees to the presumption that fiducia-
ries are inclined to place their desires for personal gain above their fiduciary
loyalty to the corporation.68 Relying on these premises, the court fashioned a
65. Other articles and sources discuss the different tests at length. See, eg., R. CLARK, supra
note 38, at 223; Brudney & Clark, supra note 2; Note, Liability of Directors for Taking Corporate
Opportunities, Using Corporate Facilities, or Engaging in a Competing Business, 39 COLUM. L. REv.
219 (1939) [hereinafter Note, Liability]; Note, The Tests of Corporate Opportunity, 8 CuMB. L. REv.
942 (1978); Note, Corporate Opportunity in the Close Corporation-A Different Result?, 56 GEO. L.J.
381 (1967); Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. Rv. 765 (1961); Note, Corporate Competi-
tion, supra note 12; Note, Opportunity Knocks, supra note 12.
66. The test described in Solimine v. Hollander, 128 N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A.2d 203 (1940), is also
cited as a separate test, although the Solimine court viewed its guidelines as a mere rearticulation of
Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 225, 5 A.2d 503 (1939), and existing case law. Solimine, 128 N.J. Eq. at
245, 16 A.2d at 215. The Solimine court concluded that the existence of any one of the following
factors precluded a finding that the opportunity belonged to the corporation: the fiduciaries' exer-
cised good faith, the corporation was unable to develop the opportunity, the opportunity was not
essential to the corporation, the fiduciaries did not use corporate resources, or the fiduciaries were
not competing with the corporation. Id. The Solimine test is a very lenient test of the fiduciaries'
conduct and yields a narrow range of opportunities that presumptively belong to the corporation.
No case in the last decade has explicitly followed Solimine.
67. 23 Del. Ch. 225, 5 A.2d 503 (1939). Guth v. Loft has been cited 225 times in Lexis as of
October 1988. Other landmark cases in this area of the law have been cited much less frequently.
Eg., Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948) (58 times); Solimine v.
Hollander, 128 N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A.2d 203 (1940) (43 times); Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co.,
126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900) (28 times); Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974)
(17 times).
68. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510. The court in Guth stated:
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of
human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate of-
ficer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty,
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test and remedy which, if strictly and faithfully adhered to, would virtually pre-
clude fiduciaries from pursuing any business activities on their own.69 Charles
Guth was the president and dominant director of Loft, Inc., a corporation whose
primary business was the manufacture of candy and soft drinks that it retailed
through its own chain of regional stores.70 While investigating possible suppli-
ers for its soft drink syrup, Guth considered a fledgling cola syrup company.
The principal of that company, who owned a secret formula for a cola syrup but
had no money, offered to sell the business to Guth. Extensively using Loft re-
sources, including loans, facilities, and personnel, Guth personally acquired and
developed the company that subsequently became the Pepsi-Cola Company. 7 1
In determining whether Guth's acquisition and development of Pepsi-Cola
usurped an opportunity belonging to Loft,72 the court delineated a variety of
factors.73 While it noted these various factors, the Guth court, and other courts
citing Guth, singled out the "line of business" analysis as the preeminent test.
The real issue is whether the opportunity to secure a very substantial
stock interest in a corporation to be formed for the purpose of exploit-
ing a cola beverage on a wholesale scale was so closely associated with
not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge,
but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to
deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to
enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.
Id. (emphasis added). The traditional remedy of a constructive trust also is consistent with the
trustee analogy and the presumption of the fiduciaries' predispositions:
The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the narrow
ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but
upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the purpose of removing all
temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confidence
imposed by the fiduciary relation.
Id. (emphasis added).
69. The test used in Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
294 U.S. 708 (1935), imposes on fiduciaries the strictest standard of the tests considered here by
essentially prohibiting fiduciaries from all opportunities.
70. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 258-61, 5 A.2d at 509-12. The court did not explain its conclusion that
Guth was able to dominate the corporation. He apparently owned no shares and joined the corpora-
tion as vice president only two years before he developed the contested opportunity.
71. Id. at 259-64, 5 A.2d at 505-08.
72. After the Pepsi-Cola acquisition, Guth served as a fiduciary to at least three corporations.
Id. at 258, 5 A.2d at 505. These multiple fiduciary roles raise a number of questions regarding which
corporation, if any, had a priority interest in the opportunity. For instance, Grace, like Pepsi-Cola,
manufactured soft drink syrups, so the opportunity was actually closer to its line of business than to
Loft's. Id. at 259, 5 A.2d at 506. Would this entitle Grace to a priority interest, or would it elimi-
nate both corporations' claims to the opportunity? Id. at 273-81, 5 A.2d at 506. Would Grace's
insolvency eliminate any claim it might have to the opportunity? For further discussion on multiple
fiduciary roles, see supra note 38.
73. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 273-81, 5 A.2d at 511-15. An opportunity did not belong to the
corporation if it was acquired in the fiduciaries' individual capacities and without the use of corpo-
rate resources or if it was not essential to the corporation, or if it was one in which the corporation
did not have an interest or expectancy. Id. at 271, 5 A.2d at 510. On the other hand, an opportunity
did belong to the corporation if it was one in which the corporation had an interest or expectancy,
was in the corporation's "line of business" and of practical advantage to it, and was one that the
corporation was financially able to exploit. Id. at 272, 5 A.2d at 511. Guth defined "expectancy"
more broadly than the traditional test in Lagarde, discussed infra text accompanying notes 83-91.
Under Guth, an existing property right to the opportunity was not necessary. Loft had a protectable
expectancy because it had a "practical and essential" interest in obtaining a satisfactory supply of
cola syrup. Guth, 23 Del Ch. at 280, 5 A.2d at 514.
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TABLE 1. TRADITIONAL TESTS: CORPORATE INTEREST AS
EXCLUSIVE CONCERN
Test





Is the opportunity in
competition with
corporation? Is the




Does the corporation have
a contractual claim to the
opportunity?
Would it be unfair to the
corporation for the
fiduciaries to pursue the
opportunity?
Is the opportunity in the
corporation's line of
business? If so, would it
be unfair to the
corporation for the
fiduciaries to pursue the
opportunity?
(Combination of line of
business test and fairness
test).
Consequences

















the existing business activities of Loft, and so essential thereto, as to
bring the transaction within that class of cases where the acquisition of
the property would throw the corporate officer purchasing it into com-
petition with his company. This is a factual question to be decided by
reasonable inferences from objective facts.74
Applying this test, the court determined that the Pepsi-Cola opportunity was so
closely associated and essential to Loft that Guth would effectively become a
74. Id. at 275, 5 A.2d at 513 (emphasis added). The court found the following factors relevant.
First, Guth received the opportunity in his corporate capacity. Id. The court reached this conclu-
sion because the opportunity became available to Guth because of his control of Loft, not because of
his individual position or personal resources. Id. at 276-77, 5 A.2d at 512-13. He also investigated
Pepsi-Cola originally as a possible supplier for Loft and subsequently learned of its availability as an
acquisition. Second, he extensively used corporate resources. Id. at 282, 5 A.2d at 515. Third,
although the corporation had no property right, the opportunity was of practical concern. Id. at
280, 5 A.2d at 514. It provided an essential commodity that was available only from a limited
number of sources. Id. at 280-82, 5 A.2d at 512-15.
In addition, the court clearly thought Guth acted egregiously and in bad faith, saying his ac-
tions were "gross violations of legal and moral duties" and that "[c]unning and craft supplanted
sincerity. Frankness gave way to concealment .... A genius in his line he may be, but the law
makes no distinction between the wrong-doing genius and the one less endowed." Id. at 282, 5 A.2d
at 515.
For further cases using the line of business test, see Annotation, What Business Opportunities
are in "Line of Business" of Corporation for Purposes of Determining Whether A Corporate Opportu-
nity was Presented, 77 A.L.R.3D 961 (1977); Note, Opportunity Knocks, supra note 12, at 257-58.
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competitor via Pepsi-Cola. 75
The court's conclusion that Pepsi-Cola would be a competitor merits fur-
ther analysis. Although it did have limited wholesale activities, Loft was essen-
tially a regional retailer of candies and soft drinks.76 There was no indication
that it intended or desired to diversify into manufacturing cola syrup. The cor-
poration was actively investigating alternative suppliers; 7" therefore one might
reasonably infer that its corporate strategy did not include such an expansion.
Because Pepsi-Cola envisioned being a nationwide wholesaler of cola syrup, it
was not a direct competitor. Loft's acquisition of Pepsi-Cola would most accu-
rately be described as the acquisition of a supplier.78
Although the court described the line of business test as one that would
preclude the fiduciaries from pursuing an opportunity that would compete with
the corporation, the court's application of the test precludes fiduciaries from
taking any opportunity to which the corporation can adapt its resources. The
court determined that Pepsi-Cola and Loft were in the same line of business
because Loft's plant, equipment, executives, personnel, and finances could have
been adequately adapted to develop the Pepsi-Cola opportunity.7 9 The whole-
sale and retail operations for soft drinks utilize different outputs and inputs,
production facilities, and distribution channels. Despite these differences, with
sufficient financial resources Loft could have adapted to this or virtually any
other diversification. Thus, under the Guth court's adaptability test, virtually all
opportunities presumptively belong to the corporation.
If courts interpret the line of business test to preclude only immediately
competitive opportunities, then the test in theory is less expansive than if it is
interpreted to preclude opportunities that may be feasible after corporate adap-
tation. Many contested opportunities, however, are competitive to the corpora-
tion.80 Hence, in practice, either the adaptability test or the competitiveness test
would reach the same result. Courts will find the fiduciaries breached their du-
ties, and the cumulative effect will be that fiduciaries will routinely lose corpo-
rate opportunity cases. 81
This result affects societal and individual interests. Next to an absolute pro-
hibition against fiduciaries' pursuit of any opportunities, the test's prohibition
against fiduciaries' pursuit of any competing opportunities is the most likely to
restrain competition in the marketplace and to infringe upon individuals' free-
75. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 281, 5 A.2d at 515.
76. Its wholesale activities in 1931 amounted to $800,000. The corporation's assets exceeded
$9,000,000. Id. at 258, 278, 5 A.2d at 505, 514.
77. Id. at 258, 5 A.2d at 505.
78. When Guth argued that the opportunity was not in Loft's line of business, the court noted
that Loft's wholesale activities were not "unimportant" and that "latitude should be allowed for the
development and expansion" of the corporate activities. Id. at 279-80, 5 A.2d at 514.
79. Id. at 280, 5 A.2d at 514. It was also concerned that Loft, because of its domination by
Guth, would be a captive purchaser of Pepsi-Cola.
80. See supra note 2.
81. Eg., Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker, 154 Ill. App. 3d 61, 506 N.E. 645 (1987);
Strangeburg v. Allied Distrib. & Bldg. Serv. Co., No. 86-12-I (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 1986)




dom to start their own businesses. Despite these consequences, the line of busi-
ness test neither acknowledges any noncorporate interests nor considers the
reasonable expectations of the parties. For example, prior to and during his
employment with Loft, Guth and his family owned the Grace Company.8 2
Grace supplied Loft and other retailers with chocolate syrup for soft drinks.
Although Grace and Pepsi-Cola had similar businesses, each having the poten-
tial for analogous corporate opportunity violations, the corporation apparently
did not object to Guth's involvement with Grace. Guth, therefore, may have
reasonably assumed that the corporation would have no objection to the Pepsi-
Cola acquisition. The line of business test as articulated in Guth, however, did
not accommodate this relevant factor.
B. Expectancy Test
An earlier case, Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co.,8 3 discussed another
traditional corporate opportunity test. It based the fiduciaries' duty on agency
principles rather than on the trustee standards controlling in Guth.84 The court
took a much more limited view of what presumptively belongs to the corpora-
tion and, consequently, the range of opportunities closed to fiduciaries:8 5 "Good
faith to the corporation does not require of its officers that they steer from their
own to the corporation's benefit, enterprises, or investments, which, though ca-
pable of profit to the corporation, have in no way become subjects of their trust
or duty."8 6
In Lagarde a family business engaged in quarrying and manufacturing
limestone was interested in acquiring a parcel of land endowed with valuable
limestone deposits. The corporation acquired an undivided one-third interest in
the land. In addition the corporation had a contractual commitment to lease
and buy the second undivided one-third interest and had tried to negotiate at
various times the purchase of the remaining one-third interest. Despite these
prior dealings, two of the three principals of the corporation personally
purchased the two outstanding one-third interests in the property.8 7
In determining whether the fiduciaries had breached their duties, the court
stated that an opportunity belonged to the corporation only if the opportunity is
one in which the corporation had an existing interest or an expectancy growing
from an existing interest, or if the fiduciaries' activities would "balk the corpora-
tion in effecting the purposes of its creation."' 88 If none of the above circum-
stances exist, the fiduciaries' duty does not arise. Other circumstances, such as
whether the individuals learned of the opportunity in their corporate or personal
capacities, were not relevant.8 9
82. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 258, 5 A.2d at 505.
83. 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
84. Id. at 500-01, 28 So. at 201.
85. Id. at 502, 28 So. at 202.
86. Id.
87. The principals used a second corporation and an agent. Id. at 498, 28 So. at 200.
88. Id. at 502, 28 So. at 201.
89. Id.
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The court interpreted a corporation's protectable interest as one based on a
contractual claim. Hence the one-third interest to which the corporation had a
contractual commitment to buy and lease was a protectable interest, while the
one-third interest to which the corporation had no contractual commitment was
not protectable. "No expectancy of value springs from the alleged fact the com-
plainant 'has been negotiating for and endeavoring to purchase' that interest at
divers [sic] undesignated times." 90 "Balking" the corporation clearly is in-
tended to be narrowly limited to those activities that conflict with the very pur-
pose for which the corporation and was formed. 91 The court did not extend the
purpose of the corporation to include anticipated or speculative business
activities.
Thus, this test would carve out for the corporation only those opportunities
for which it actually has a contract. By nature, these are opportunities of which
the corporation has knowledge, was or is actually pursuing, and to which the
corporation is reciprocally legally committed. Because this describes a compara-
tively narrow range of opportunities, fiduciaries subject to this test would be in a
more favorable litigation position than those fiduciaries subject to the line of
business test.92
Like the line of business test, the expectancy test does not explicitly con-
sider societal and individual interests. In contrast to the line of business test,
however, the expectancy test, by allowing the fiduciaries' pursuit of any opportu-
nities except those to which the corporation has a contractual claim, is mini-
mally intrusive on the fiduciaries' right to start a competing business. In fact,
even without the expectancy test, fiduciaries probably could not pursue opportu-
nities to which the corporation already had a contractual claim since, by doing
so, the fiduciaries would be interfering with the presumably binding contractual
relations between the corporation and its contracting party.
Even though the expectancy test may operate to foster competition, as in
Lagarde, its results are not reliable because of its failure to consider the crucial
relevant interests. The test's consideration of how the corporation would expect
to resolve a corporate opportunity dispute is reasonable and important. The
approach suggests that the Lagarde court wanted to resolve the dispute in a
realistic context. The court however, does not, consider how the fiduciaries
would expect to resolve the dispute. The court did not consider the fiduciaries'
prior dealings or agreements with the corporation, the customs of the industry,
or any other factors which could indicate the fiduciaries' expectations of how the
dispute should be resolved. Because it ignores the fiduciaries' expectations, the
Lagarde court's analysis of the corporate-fiduciary relationship is incomplete. 93
90. Id.
91. Examples include the right of way in the path of the projected route of a railroad company,
or the patent rights to the work that was the purpose of a corporation's creation. Id. at 502, 28 So.
at 201-02.
92. In Georgia the courts have adopted a model based on Lagarde's expectancy test, and the
cases decided under that test illustrate that test's favorability to fiduciaries. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 195-223.
93. In light of the court's limited perspective, its determination that the corporation's expecta-
tions are limited to contractually based opportunities is surprising. One would have predicted that
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A final problem with Lagarde's expectancy test is that it does not promote
the integrity of the corporate-fiduciary relationship. It puts fiduciaries in a po-
tentially compromising position. If they are precluded only from opportunities
on which the corporation has a contract, they may be tempted to exercise less
than their best efforts to obtain the contract for the corporation. By exerting less
than their best efforts, they may increase the probability that the corporation
does not culminate a contract. Under Lagarde's test, the absence of a corporate
contract would then allow the fiduciaries to pursue the opportunity without fear
of liability.
C. Fairness Test
The traditional corporate opportunity test of fairness was announced in
Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc.94 The Durfee court stated:
[T]he true basis of the governing doctrine rests fundamentally on the
unfairness in the particular circumstances of a director, whose relation
to the corporation is fiduciary, "taking advantage of an opportunity
[for his personal profit] when the interest of the corporation justly calls
for protection. This calls for the application of ethical standards of
what is fair and equitable... [ini particular sets of facts.95
The court offered no specific guidelines on what constitutes fairness. It sug-
gested only that defendant's use of corporate resources, the corporation's finan-
cial inability to develop the opportunity, and the corporation's acquiescence
after sufficient disclosure of the fiduciary's exploitation of the opportunity may
have been relevant factors.9 6
Ballantine on Corporations, credited by the Durfee court for its fairness test,
does cite various factors. First are factors generally regarding the relationship
between the opportunity and the corporation, including whether the opportu-
nity was of special value to the corporation, whether the corporation was ac-
tively negotiating for the opportunity, whether the corporation was in a financial
position to pursue the opportunity, and whether the fiduciaries would be put in
an "adverse and hostile position" to the corporation. Second are factors gener-
ally regarding the relationship between the fiduciaries and the opportunity, in-
cluding whether the fiduciaries received the opportunity because of their
corporate positions, whether the fiduciaries were delegated to pursue the oppor-
tunity on behalf of the corporation, whether the fiduciaries used corporate re-
sources in identifying or developing the opportunity, and whether the fiduciaries
intended to resell the opportunity to the corporation.97 The fairness test does
the court would interpret the corporation's expectation to include a broader range of opportunities.
Thus, the court not only ignored the fiduciaries' expectations, but inaccurately assessed the corpora-
tion's expectations. A realistic projection of the corporation's and fiduciaries' reasonable expecta-
tions would indicate that the corporation should have a legitimate claim to more than contractually-
based opportunities.
94. 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948).
95. Id. at 199, 80 N.E.2d at 529 (citing BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONs 204-05 (rev. ed.
1946)).
96. Id at 200, 202, 80 N.E.2d at 529, 531.
97. BALLANTINE, supra note 95, at 206; see R. CLARK, supra note 38, at 228; Annotation,
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not elevate any particular factor to a preeminent position, but rather weighs the
factors on a case-by-case basis on an ideal but unarticulated equitable scale.
The problem with the fairness test is that it is too vague and thus provides
no predictable guidelines on which fiduciaries and corporations may base their
conduct. While courts can use the test's various equitable considerations to
shape a decision on a case-by-case basis, the test does not offer preventive guide-
lines. In addition, the test studies the fiduciaries' conduct only to determine if
the corporation has been unfairly harmed. It does not consider what is fair to
the fiduciaries or society.
D. Miller Two-Step Test
The test introduced in Miller v. Miller9" is on its facb merely the combina-
tion of the line of business test and the fairness test into a sequential two-step
process. It is, however, distinguishable from the other tests in its analytical ap-
proach to the determination of liability and in its implicit consideration of the
fiduciaries' interests.
In Miller a minority shareholder of a family business sued his two brothers.
Defendants were the active managers of Miller Waste, a corporation that manu-
factured waste wiping cloths for industrial use.99 Defendant brothers and their
wives personally established and developed five businesses separate from the
original corporation over the span of a decade. Several of these businesses pros-
pered to multi-million dollar enterprises. In determining whether the defend-
ants were liable to the original corporation for establishing the other businesses,
the court considered the threshold issue of whether the opportunity belonged to
the corporation.l0 Using a flexible application of Guth's line of business test,
the court stated that if the opportunity "bears no logical or reasonable relation
to the existing or prospective business activities of the corporation or [if the
corporation] lacks either the financial or fundamental practical or technical abil-
ity to pursue it, then such opportunity would have to be found to be
noncorporate as a matter of law." 10 1 The factors focus on the relationship be-
tween the opportunity and characteristics of the corporation. The plaintiffs have
the burden of proof on this threshold inquiry.' 0 2
If the court deems the opportunity to be a corporate one, then the analysis
proceeds to the second step, which consists of an application of the fairness
test.10 3 It requires an evaluation of the equitable considerations existing before,
Fairness to Corporation Where "Corporate Opportunity" is Allegedly Usurped by Officer or Director,
17 A.L.R.4TH 479 (1982); Note, Opportunity Knocks, supra note 12, at 259.
98. 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).
99. The corporation was started by their parents and had grown into a substantially large busi-
ness. Id. at 210, 222 N.W.2d at 73.
100. Id. at 224, 222 N.W.2d at 73.
101. See id at 225, 222 N.W.2d at 81.
102. Id
103. Id. A finding, however, of a corporate opportunity may end the inquiry and impose liabil-
ity on the defendant if the opportunity is essential to the corporation and deprivation would directly
interfere with existing corporate activities. Id. at 225-26, 222 N.W.2d at 82.
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during, and after the fiduciaries' development of the opportunity. The court
offers another series of factors, all of which relate to the defendants' capacities
and conduct regarding the opportunity.' 0 4 Despite this focus on the defendants'
actions, the court emphasized that a finding of bad faith is not necessary to
finding liability, nor is a finding of good faith sufficient to preclude liability.10 5
Defendants have the burden of proof in this fairness inquiry.' 06
The court's explanation of the steps was not followed by an explanation of
how step one of the test applied to the Miller facts. The court concluded, with-
out elaboration, that three of the five businesses could be deemed to be opportu-
nities belonging to the corporation because they were in the line of business of
the corporation.' 0 7 Under the Guth test, this conclusion would be sufficient for
finding liability. 108
In the second step of their analysis, however, the Miller court determined
that the defendant brothers ultimately were not liable.' 0 9 The court considered
a variety of factors-in particular that defendants' dealings with the corporation
were fair and that defendants carried out their corporate duties in good faith.1 0
Not only was there no egregious behavior, but the fiduciaries devoted their best
efforts to the corporation through working long hours, developing new lines of
business, lending the corporation money when needed, and transacting all busi-
ness between the corporation and their separate businesses at terms that were
profitable to the corporation. They even made one of the businesses a captive
purchaser of the corporation."' Furthermore, no corporate resources were
used to develop the businesses. The relevant factors on which the court pre-
mised their conclusions were that defendants apparently performed their basic
responsibilities to the corporation diligently and that they did not harm the cor-
poration by unfair bargaining or use of its resources.1 12
The Miller test differs from the other traditional tests in a fundamental
way; it does not presume the fiduciaries' use of an opportunity deemed to belong
to the corporation automatically results in a breach of duty. Under the Miller
test, if the court deems the opportunity to belong to the corporation under step
one, the fiduciaries' liability does not automatically follow. Rather the court
presumes that there are circumstances under which the fiduciaries' taking of an
opportunity that belongs to the corporation may be justified. The court thus
contributes a significant analytical distinction that subsequent courts have fol-
lowed in their formulations of two-step tests.1 1 3
104. Id. at 226, 222 N.W.2d at 81-82.
105. Id. at 226, 222 N.W.2d at 82.
106. Id. at 227, 222 N.W.2d at 82.
107. Id. at 227, 222 N.W.2d at 82-83.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 67-82.
109. Miller, 301 Minn. at 227-29, 222 N.W.2d at 82-83.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 228, 222 N.W.2d at 83.
112. Id. at 228-29, 222 N.W.2d at 83.
113. E.g., Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328 (Miss. 1979); Warren v. Century Bankcorp.,
Inc., 741 P.2d 846 (Okla. 1987); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).
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In addition, the Miller court's scrutiny of the fiduciaries' conduct suggests a
possible implicit consideration of the fiduciaries' perspective. The other tradi-
tional tests and landmark cases study the fiduciaries' conduct only to assess the
extent to which the fiduciaries' conduct harmed the corporation or if the fiducia-
ries learned of the opportunity in their personal or corporate capacities.114
While Miller considered these factors, it also assessed whether the fiduciaries
satisfied their general corporate responsibilities. The court concluded that the
fiduciaries' diligence and good faith in performing their general corporate role
was persuasive evidence that they acted properly regarding the contested oppor-
tunities.115 The time and talent the fiduciaries used to manage five other corpo-
rations did not interfere with their duties to the corporation. This conclusion
implicitly recognizes that fiduciaries agree to perform properly one hundred per-
cent of the job they have accepted, but that they have not assigned to the corpo-
ration their talents, energies, and efforts beyond that, unless they have expressly
agreed to do so.
On the other hand, the Miller court did not recognize other facts relevant to
the parties' reasonable expectations. For example, defendants developed the five
businesses over the span of a decade. Thus, it would seem reasonable for the
defendant brothers to have assumed that the corporation had waived any claims
it might have to these ongoing activities. Moreover, the Miller test, like the
other tests, did not explicitly acknowledge societal interests clearly implicated by
the facts. The court did not acknowledge, for example, that precluding defend-
ants from the opportunities might hinder the creation of new businesses or inter-
fere with the individuals' freedom to pursue their interests in the business forms
of their choice.
In summary, traditional corporate opportunity tests do not explicitly ac-
knowledge noncorporate interests. In at least three ways, however, a considera-
tion of the fiduciaries' interests and perspective may be implied. As discussed
above, the first is found in Miller v. Miller.'16 There the court considered the
fiduciaries' diligence to their corporate responsibilities in concluding that the
fiduciaries were not liable.
Second, cases following the expectancy test, either in its traditional articula-
tion in Lagarde or in its revived articulation in more recent Georgia cases, define
opportunities belonging to the corporation as those with which the corporation
has a contractually based claim. 1 7 Particularly in contrast to the line of busi-
ness test, the expectancy test defines the corporation's proprietary rights nar-
rowly. One may infer that by defining the corporation's proprietary rights
narrowly and thus inherently defining the opportunities that the fiduciaries may
pursue expansively, the test is implicitly acknowledging and protecting the fidu-
ciaries' interests.
Third, an analysis of the outcomes of the cases of the last decade reveals
114. See supra text accompanying notes 82, 92-93, 97.
115. Miller, 301 Minn. at 228, 222 N.W.2d at 83.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 98-115.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 83-93 and infra text accompanying notes 187-225.
[Vol. 67
CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
that the fiduciaries in those cases were as likely to win as the corporation.,'1
One explanation for this result is that courts, while not articulating their reason-
ig, implicitly or intuitively considered noncorporate interests. If the courts
truly considered only the corporate interest, one would have predicted that the
corporation would have won more cases than the fiduciaries.
While these examples illustrate that courts are following their instinct that
the stated principles of the doctrine are unbalanced, such an inferential or im-
plicit recognition of competing interests is not enough. The corporate opportu-
nity doctrine should directly acknowledge the existence of individual and social
interests.
IV. THE EVOLVING DocTuNE
A study of how the corporate opportunity doctrine has evolved in the last
decade reveals that the law is in transition. There is considerable variation
among states' laws. 119 In some jurisdictions the law is confused and unpredict-
able. In other jurisdictions the courts are gravitating toward one or more emerg-
ing models by which to resolve corporate opportunity disputes. This Article
continues with a brief exploration of the doctrinal confusion found in some juris-
dictions and then turns its attention to a detailed review of the emerging models.
A. Doctrinal Confusion
Some courts are clearly struggling with the inadequacies of the traditional
tests.120 Some cases reflect an ambivalent, sometimes incomprehensible ap-
proach to corporate opportunity problems. The courts cite traditional tests in
an almost perfunctory way, but the test on which they actually rely is sometimes
118. See supra note 2.
119. Under the internal affairs rule, the law of the state of incorporation governs disputes arising
from the internal operations and relationships of the corporation, including the fiduciary duties of
directors and officers. Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., 254 Ga. 734, 334 S.E.2d 308 (1985);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302, 313 (1971); Kozyris, Corporate Wars
and Choice of Law, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1, 3-5.
Some courts, however, do not recognize the choice of law issue. See, eg., Southeast Consul-
tants, Inc. v. McCrary Eng'g Corp., 246 Ga. 503, 273 S.E.2d 112 (1980) (applying Georgia law to a
Wisconsin corporation); Sabre Farms, Inc. v. Jordan, 78 Ore. App. 323, 717 P.2d 156 (1986),petition
denied, 80 Or. App. 789, 723 P.2d 1078 (1986) (applying Oregon law to a Montana corporation); cf
Diedrich, 254 Ga. at 736, 334 S.E.2d at 310 (addressing choice of law issue in McCrary, 246 Ga. 503,
273 S.E.2d 112).
The law chosen can alter the litigation outcome. For example, in Tuckman v. Aerosonic Corp.,
No. 4094 (Del. Ch. May 20, 1982) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file), the court acknowledged that
Florida law was the applicable law but applied Delaware law on the assumption that Florida law was
the same. At that time the Fifth Circuit had interpreted Florida law as adopting a type of line of
business test. Farber v. Servan Land Co., 662 F.2d 371, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1981) (inquiring whether
the opportunity was within the valid corporate purpose, whether it "fit" into present activities or
established corporate policies). In contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court had used a test based on
the corporation's expectancy and capabilities. Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp.,
425 A.2d 957, 963 (Del. 1980). The Tuckman court's erroneous application of Delaware law im-
posed a different test, and arguably a different outcome, on the litigants than would have resulted
under Florida law.
120. Courts have recognized repeatedly the problems and confusion of the traditional tests. See,
eg., Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222, 222 N.W.2d 71, 79 (1974) (explaining its search in vain for
an appropriate test).
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unrecognizable as the traditional tests cited.12 1 Because the traditional tests and
the eventual results are not consistent, these courts often cannot provide logical,
well-reasoned explanations for the results. They instead follow the routine of
elaborately stating the facts, citing the tests, and announcing their conclusion.
Unfortunately, the analytical step of explaining how the legal principles are ap-
plied to the facts to reach the indicated legal conclusion often is missing.
The result is that various jurisdictions appear to have incongruent and un-
predictable approaches to corporate opportunity disputes. Even within the same
jurisdictions, the courts sometimes cite different tests. 122 Even when the courts
121. For example, while stating that Guth is the applicable law, courts use different techniques to
avoid its application--commonly to constrict the expansiveness of the test. For instance, the Dela-
ware courts impose a corollary, based on Equity Corp. v. Milton, 43 Del. Ch. 160, 164, 221 A.2d
494, 497 (1966), on the Guth test that narrows its application considerably. Science Accessories
Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 963-64 (Del. 1980); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512,
518-19 (Del. Ch. 1978). The corollary transforms the test to three required elements: the opportu-
nity is essential to the corporation or is one in which there is an interest or expectancy; the fiduciaries
take the opportunity while in their corporate rather than individual capacities; and the corporation is
financially able to exploit the opportunity. Schreiber, 396 A.2d at 519. Although the courts call this
a corollary to the Guth test, a review of the elements indicates the elimination of the line of business
analysis. Therefore, the corollary effectively replaces the traditional test.
The court in Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., 4 Haw. App. 359, 368-69, 667 P.2d 804, 813 (1983),
took a second approach to avoiding the line of business test, citing Hill v. Hill, 279 Pa. Super. 154,
420 A.2d 1078 (1980). The court cited Guth as the applicable test, but stated that it must dispense
with threshold issues prior to applying Guth. Lussier, 4 Haw. App. at 368, 667 P.2d at 813. The
threshold inquiries are the corporation's financial inability to pursue the opportunity, the fiduciaries'
disclosure regarding the opportunity and receipt of corporate consent, and the noninjury of corpo-
rate creditors. IdL at 368-69, 667 P.2d at 813. If the parties cannot substantiate these conditions,
then the Guth test is never reached. See id. at 370, 667 P.2d at 813. In Lussier, substantiation was a
simple matter because expansive standards determined financial inability, disclosure and consent.
Id. at 367-70, 667 P.2d at 812-13. The court measured financial inability on a lack of liquid funds
rather than on a lack of credit potential. The fiduciary made its disclosure to the corporation infor-
mally, and the court implied the corporation's consent by its failure to object. Id. at 367, 667 P.2d at
812-13. With these findings the court simply preempted the Guth test.
In contrast, some courts adhere carefully to the Guth analysis. See, eg., Stangeberg v. Allied
Distrib. & Bldg. Serv. Co., No. 86-12-II (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Omni
file); Imperial Group, Inc. v. Scholnick, 709 S.W.2d 358, 368 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). A number of
courts also continue to use some form of the line of business test. Several Illinois cases, for example,
inquire whether the opportunity is "reasonably incident" to the corporation's activities. See
Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker, 154 Ill. App. 3d 61, 67, 506 N.E.2d 645, 650 (1987); Peterson
Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas Prods., Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764, 467 N.E.2d 1068, 1072
(1984). In addition, one basis for determining when a fiduciary should disclose an opportunity under
the ALI model is whether the opportunity is closely related to the corporation's business. ALI Draft,
supra note 25, § 5.05(b)(2) illus. 4, at 113.
122. Illinois courts use different tests without explaining the distinctions. Several cases interpret-
ing Illinois law cite a variation of the line of business test, asking whether the opportunity is "reason-
ably incident to the corporation's present or prospective business and is one in which the corporation
has the capacity to engage." See Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker, 154 Ill. App. 3d 61, 67, 506
N.E.2d 645, 650 (1987); Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas Prods., Inc., 126 Il. App. 3d 759,
764, 467 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (1984); see, eg., Carlstead v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 86C 1927 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 9, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Weigel v. Shapiro, No. 78C 668 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 2, 1978) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file). One of these cases, however, interprets this
"reasonably incident" test as the expectancy test. Lindenhurst, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 68, 506 N.E.2d at
650. Other Illinois cases select a variety of tests, focusing on the fiduciaries' use of corporate re-
sources. See, eg., Graham v. Mimms, II1 Ill. App. 3d 751, 763-64, 444 N.E.2d 549, 557 (1982)
(focusing on the fiduciaries' use of corporate resources, or the corporation's legal ability to pursue
the opportunity), cert. denied, 93 Ill. Rep. 2d 542 (1983); Valiquet v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
87 Ill. App. 3d 195, 203-04, 408 N.E.2d 921, 927-28 (1980) (same), cert. denied, 81 Ill. Rep. 2d 606
(1980). Another Illinois case considers whether the corporation has an expectancy in the opportu-
nity and whether the fiduciary's acquisition of the opportunity would hinder the corporation's busi-
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cite the same test, they interpret them differently. 123
Two Pennsylvania cases particularly illustrate these inconsistencies. 124
Ampersand Productions, Inc. v. Stahl125 involved a corporation that produced
plays. A shareholder and officer produced, on his personal behalf, a new play
that was originally written for the corporation. The Ampersand court held that
the opportunity was clearly within the "scope of corporate activities" and that
the fiduciary used corporate assets to develop the opportunity. 12 6 No liability
was imposed, however, because the play was not profitable and the fiduciary
thus was not unjustly enriched. 127 CST, Inc. v. Mark 128 had strikingly analo-
gous facts. A corporation involved in the advertising business produced a travel
guide to be used as an advertising supplement in newspapers in the state of Vir-
ginia. An officer of the corporation negotiated to produce a revised edition of
the travel guide through his own private company, even though the corporation
was clearly interested in pursuing the project itself.129 The officer ultimately
returned the project to the corporation, although the corporation was financially
unable to develop the project. Without articulating a particular test, the CST
court concluded that the officer breached his duty because he never received the
corporation's consent and that the corporation, although financially strained,
was not insolvent. 130 The court then turned to the issue of the fiduciary's liabil-
ity. Since he had returned the project to the corporation, he was not unjustly
ness plans and purposes. Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk, 145 111. App. 3d 355, 360, 995 N.E.2d 1006,
1011 (1986) (essentially the same formula used in a Colorado case, Three G Corp. v. Daddis, 714
P.2d 1333, 1336 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986)). Although the Illinois Supreme Court focuses on agency
principles and disclosure, see Mullaney, Wells & Co. v. Savage, 78 Ill. 2d 534, 546-50, 402 N.E.2d
574, 583 (1980), lower state courts and federal courts apparently have chosen not to follow that
precedent.
123. Recent Massachusetts cases, for example, reveal the lack of a cogent and predictable line of
reasoning and analysis. See, eg., Martin v. Kagann (in re Tuffs Elecs., Inc.), 746 F.2d 915, 917 (1st
Cir. 1984) (calling the corporate opportunity doctrine a rule of disclosure, but not elaborating on
what test or procedure is applicable); O'Hara v. Robbins, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 279, 283-84, 432 N.E.2d
560, 563 (1982) (citing no test at all, but referring instead to BBF, Inc. v. Germanium Power Devices
Corp., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 430 N.E.2d 1221 (1982), which only generally discussed the duty of
loyalty and the importance of fiduciaries following instructions), appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1102, 440
N.E.2d 1175*(1982); Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 299-302, 438 N.E.2d
391, 393-94 (1982) (citing Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948),
without identifying its fairness test, noting instead that the activity of the new business is clearly
within the corporation's activities).
124. Other cases support the conclusion that there is no apparent agreement on the appropriate
corporate opportunity test to be used in Pennsylvania. One case cites no test at all and offers no
reasoning before concluding that liability under the doctrine is appropriate, citing only a state stat-
ute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon 1967) (repealed 1986), on ficuciary duty of due care.
S.N.T. Indus. v. Geanopulos, 363 Pa. Super. 97, 102, 525 A.2d 736, 739 (1987) (per curiam). An-
other case, Hill v. Hill, 279 Pa. Super. 154, 420 A.2d 1078 (1980), emphasizes disclosure, stating that
a fiduciary may seize a corporate opportunity if the shareholders consent and if it is not harmful to
creditors. Id. at 163, 420 A.2d at 1082. Although other Pennsylvania cases cite Hill, they do not
follow its analysis.
125. No. 85-4358 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 360 Pa. Super. 303, 520 A.2d 469 (1987).
129. Id at 306-07, 520 A.2d at 811..
130. Id. at 309-10, 520 A.2d at 471-72.
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enriched.13 1 The court nonetheless concluded that the fiduciary was liable for
lost profits, even though neither he nor the corporation had received any revenue
from the venture.1 32
In both Ampersand and CST, the corporation had substantial prior dealings
related to the opportunity and indicated an interest in pursuing the new oppor-
tunity. The fiduciaries in these cases nonetheless pursued the opportunity on
their own behalf. Neither fiduciary, however, benefitted economically from his
endeavor. In Ampersand the fiduciary brought the play to production but it
yielded no profits. In CST the fiduciary never implemented the project.
Although the facts were strikingly analogous, the courts treated the cases differ-
ently, applying different tests and following different theories upon which reme-
dies should be based. Ampersand imposed a variation of the line of business test,
recognizing that the opportunity was exactly the type of business activity the
corporation ordinarily pursued. 133 CST instead emphasized two factors: first,
whether the fiduciary disclosed and the corporation consented to the fiduciary's
taking of the opportunity; and second, whether the corporation had the theoreti-
cal ability to pursue the opportunity.134 The courts also differed on whether
liability was contingent on the fiduciaries' unjust enrichment. In what would
appear to be a stronger case for the fiduciary because of the fiduciary's attempt
to rectify his conduct and the corporation's actual inability to pursue the oppor-
tunity, the court in CST nonetheless penalized the fiduciary despite the absence
of unjust enrichment. It presumably reasoned that the deterrent effect merited
the harsh remedy.
The doctrinal inconsistencies illustrated above in the Pennsylvania cases
can be explained. The courts are dissatisfied with the results of the traditional
tests, yet feel constrained by generations of cases citing these tests as the appro-
priate standards. The courts intuitively believe that the tests are incomplete and
unbalanced but do not articulate the relevant policy interests. The resulting
legal principles are therefore unclear and inadequate.
Some courts are responding to the inadequacies of the traditional tests and
the doctrinal confusion by seeking a more coherent basis upon which to resolve
these disputes. These courts are emphasizing a certain aspect of the circum-
stances surrounding the corporate opportunity, namely, the corporation's capa-
bility, the corporation's reasonable expectations, or the fiduciaries' disclosure.
While these factors are relevant factors under the traditional tests, they assume a
more dominant and integral role with recent courts, often becoming a concep-
tual core around which the disputes are resolved. Although the courts have not
labeled them as such, these aspects can be viewed for analytical purposes as the
bases for three emerging models: (1) the corporate capability model, 13 5 (2) the
corporate expectations model, 136 and (3) the disclosure model. 137 The adopting
131. Id. at 310, 520 A.2d at 472.
132. Id. at 306-07, 520 A.2d at 472-73.
133. See Ampersand, No. 85-4358 (E.D. Pa. Feb 20, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
134. See CST, 306 Pa. Super. at 309-310, 520 A.2d at 471-72.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 140-86.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 187-225.
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courts hope these models, as summarized in Table 2, provide a coherent basis for
resolving corporate opportunity disputes. At the same time, each model has
TABLE 2. EMERGING CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY MODELS
Model Key Inquiries Consequences
Corporate Was the corporation able If not, then the fiduciaries
Capability (financially, legally, probably would not be
Model practically) to pursue the precluded from the
opportunity? opportunity.
Corporate Is the opportunity within If so, then the fiduciaries
Expectations the corporation's are precluded from the
Model reasonable expectations? opportunity.
Disclosure Did the fiduciaries disclose If not, then the fiduciaries
Model the opportunity and the are precluded from the
corporation consent to the opportunity.
fiduciaries' taking of it?
certain attributes on which the adopting courts apparently place a high value.
The corporate capability model serves efficiency goals, the corporate expecta-
tions model reflects the corporation's understanding of its rights, and the disclo-
sure model serves the administrative goals of ease of monitoring and reasonable
objectivity. These models are not exclusive and courts have combined aspects of
more than one model or other considerations in their analyses. 138 While the
models have noteworthy benefits, they all have one fundamental shortcoming.
The models focus exclusively on protecting the interests of the corporation; they
do not acknowledge competing societal and individual interests.139
B. Corporate Capability Model
While the traditional line of business test asks whether the corporation con-
ceivably could adapt its resources in order to exploit the contested opportunity,
some courts in recent cases have found this inquiry too speculative. These
courts instdad ask the more objective question of whether the corporation had
the actual capacity to develop the opportunity.14°
137. See infra text accompanying notes 226-32.
138. See, eg., Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 4 Haw. App. 359, 667 P.2d 804 (1983) (combining
corporate capability and fiduciary disclosure); Lindenburst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker, 154 Ill. App.3d
61, 506 N.E.2d 645 (1987) (considered corporate capabilities and expectations as well as fiduciary
disclosure); In re Saftey Int'l, Inc., 775 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1984) (considering corporate expectations
and capabilities).
139. See Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary Eng'g Corp., 246 Ga. 503, 509, 273 S.E.2d 112,
117 (1980) (applying corporate expectations model while noting the effect of the line of business test
on former officers' ability to compete with the corporation).
140. See, eg., Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physicians, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 326 S.E.2d 460 (1985)
(business practicality constraints); Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 4 Haw. App. 368, 667 P.2d 804
(1983) (financial capacity); Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas Prods., Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d
759,467 N.E.2d 1068 (1984) (business practicality constraints); Graham v. Mimms, 111 Ill. App. 3d
751, 444 N.E.2d 549 (1982) (same), cert. denied, 93 Ill. 2d 542 (1983); Valiquet v. First Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 87 Ill. App. 3d 195, 408 N.E.2d 921 (legal and financial capacity), cert denied, 81 Ill. 2d 606
(1980); ElIzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328 (Miss. 1979) (same); Anderson v. Clemens Mobile
Homes, Inc., 214 Neb. 283, 333 N.W.2d 900 (1983) (same); Warren v. Century Bankorp., Inc., 741
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According to this model, a corporation's inability to exploit the opportunity
argues against precluding the fiduciaries from pursuing it. Allowing the fiducia-
ries to exploit an opportunity under these circumstances means that the fiducia-
ries can be involved in a productive activity in which the corporation could not
engage. At the same time, the corporation arguably is not harmed because it
could not have pursued and benefitted from the opportunity even if it wanted to
do so. To prohibit fiduciaries from exploiting the opportunity under these cir-
cumstances would be wasteful, particularly if the opportunity is one that would
not be exploited by a third party. Even if a random third party is willing to
exploit the opportunity, the fiduciaries, because of their particular background
and expertise, may be more efficient and effective at developing it.
The corporate capability model poses several problems. First, by focusing
on the corporation's capabilities, it obscures the real issue: Who has the right to
exploit the opportunity? If the corporation has that right, then it is up to the
corporation to decide whether it will exercise that right and try to develop the
opportunity. It may have sufficient resources, but for business strategy reasons
or for no apparent reason at all, it may decline to do so. A determination of
legal rights should take precedence over the efficiency benefits described
above. 141 On the other hand, if the corporation does not have the right to ex-
ploit the opportunity, then the fiduciaries may pursue the opportunity regardless
of the corporation's capabilities.
In some circumstances, however, who has the right to exploit the opportu-
nity is unclear. For example, both the corporation and the fiduciaries may have
legitimate claims. Then the corporation's capabilities are relevant in determin-
ing how the parties would reasonably expect to resolve the dispute. The parties
probably would not expect the corporation to receive the profits from an oppor-
tunity that it truly could not have pursued on its own. Because of its incapaci-
ties, the corporation could not have relied upon or expected to pursue the
opportunity. In fact, the corporation's receipt of the value of the opportunity
could be characterized as an unwarranted windfall.
A second problem with the corporate capability model is the legitimacy of
the initial inquiry. A retrospective determination that the corporation was le-
gally or financially incapable of pursuing the opportunity does not necessarily
mean that the corporation, if actually given the chance, would not have devel-
oped the opportunity. If it made economic or business sense to do so, a corpora-
tion probably could eliminate these incapacities. For example, it could amend
P.2d 846 (Okla. 1987) (legal capacity); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Or. 662, 695 P.2d 906, 912 (1985)
(same); Stangenberg v. Allied Distrib. & Bldg. Serv. Co., No. 86-12-Il (Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 1986)
(LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (same).
141. A priority of property rights is found in United States intellectual property laws, under
which the owners of intellectual property rights may choose not to use the intellectual property even
though its use may be of value to others. See P. AREADA & L. KAPLIOUS, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
441 (4th ed. 1988). In contrast, under Chinese law, owners must use the intellectual property or risk
losing their proprietary rights to its exclusive use. See, e.g., Patent Law of the People's Republic of
China, adopted March 12, 1984 at the 4th Sess. of the Standing Comm. of the 6th Nat'l People's
Congress, Art. 52, reprinted in LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
195 (trans. 1984) (entity may receive a compulsory license to exploit a patent if patentee does not use
patented process within three years of its grant).
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its statement of purposes to permit the development of the opportunity, or ob-
tain new funds through additional equity investments or loans. If necessary, it
could establish a new company specifically to develop the opportunity. The only
real corporate incapacities that would preclude the corporation's exploitation of
the opportunity would be those few which it could not alter. For example, the
party offering the opportunity may adamantly refuse, for reasons over which
neither the corporation nor the fiduciaries have control or can change, to allow
the corporation to develop the opportunity. Other than these types of incapaci-
ties, the only definitive way to determine if the corporation would have devel-
oped the opportunity is for the corporation actually to have considered and
rejected the opportunity. l4 2
Even assuming the basic legitimacy of analyzing the corporation's capabili-
ties, the courts' current application of the model is incomplete. The courts con-
sider only the corporation's incapabilities. In the same way that the
corporation's inabilities may favor the fiduciaries' exploitation of the opportuni-
ties, the fiduciaries' inability to exploit successfully the opportunity should favor
the corporation's rights to the opportunity. Likewise, the fiduciaries' (or the
corporation's) particular talents and advantages in developing the particular op-
portunity should favor their respective access to the opportunity. Indeed, if the
probability of success would be enhanced if the fiduciaries and the corporation
jointly exploited the opportunity, then court decisions that encourage this alter-
native are desirable. 14 3
1. Legal Capacity
In theory, limitations on a corporation's legal power or authority may pre-
clude its developing a particular opportunity. A business activity, for example,
may be contrary to the corporate purposes stated in the articles of incorporation.
While there may be some interpretational differences in the corporation's state-
ment of purposes, 14 4 a violation of the corporation's purposes would be reason-
ably easy to identify and substantiate. The instances of these violations would
seem rare, considering how broadly the statement of purposes is usually drafted.
In addition, amending the statement of purposes is typically a straightforward
corporate process, assuming that there is shareholder support for the change.145
A second type of legal incapacity may arise when the opportunity is outside
the scope of permissible activities of the particular type of institution or enter-
prise, as limited by laws under which they are created. Banks and other finan-
cial institutions, for example, may be prohibited from certain business
142. Requiring fiduciaries to disclose and give the corporation the right of first refusal on all
opportunities, however, results in certain costs. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30 and infra
text accompanying notes 227-32.
143. See also infra note 335 (discussing different forms of joint development).
144. See, eg., Coupounas v. Morad, 361 So. 2d 6, 9 (Ala. 1978).
145. But see Carrad, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in Delaware: A Guide to Corporate
Planning and Anticipatory Defensive Measures, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 27-43 (1977) (offering drafting
precautions against future amendments of the corporate purpose).
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activities.146 Finally, the opportunity itself or related activities may violate a
contractual provision to which the corporation is a party. For example, loan
agreements can restrict expansion of corporate activities or assumption of fur-
ther debt.
2. Financial Ability
Courts have given much attention to the issue of financial ability and have
diverse views on its appropriate role in corporate opportunity disputes. Some
treat it as an element of the cause of action or as a defense.147 Some follow the
principle offered in Irving Trust v. Deutsch 148 that the issue of financial ability is
irrelevant.1 49 , Those courts believe that allowing the corporation's financial in-
ability to preclude the fiduciaries' liability would tempt fiduciaries to exercise
less than their best efforts in obtaining the necessary financial resources for the
corporation, or to otherwise manipulate the financial condition of the business so
that the corporation appears financially unable to pursue the opportunity.150
In contrast to the Irving Trust principle, the trend in recent cases is to treat
financial ability as relevant. There are various ways in which courts may at-
tempt to determine the corporation's financial inability. The most direct way
evaluates the financial feasibility of the corporation's undertaking of the particu-
lar opportunity. This requires a comparison between the corporation's financial
resources, including accessible debt financing, for expansion or diversification,
and the cost of exploiting the specific idea, including the cost of adjustments in
the corporation's current facilities.15 1 While some courts implicitly use this ap-
proach, 152 they do not expressly calculate financial feasibility. The courts' reti-
146. See, eg., Valiquet v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 87 I11. App. 3d 195, 197, 408 N.E.2d
921, 923 (1980) (banks not allowed to enter into insurance business); Warren v. Century Bankcorp.,
Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 847-48 & n.2 (Okla. 1987) (branch banking prohibited). There may be interpre-
tational differences in determining exactly what activities are prohibited. See, eg., Warren, 741 P.2d
at 854 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (indicating that the bank was precluded from the opportunity by
branch banking laws).
147. Ag., Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 4. Haw. App 359, 368, 667 P.2d 804, 813 (1983);
Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328, 1335 (Miss. 1979); Anderson v. Clemens Mobile Homes,
Inc., 214 Neb. 283, 289-90, 333 N.W.2d 900, 904-05 (1983); Warren v. Century Bankcorp., Inc., 741
P.2d 846, 849 n.l1 (Okla. 1987); Stangenberg v. Allied Distrib. & Bldg. Serv. Co., No. 86-12-I
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 9, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file); see also Graham v. Mimms, 111 11.
App. 3d 751, 444 N.E.2d 549 (1982). For different views on financial ability, see Klinicki v. Lund-
gren, 298 Or. 662, 667-75, 695 P.2d 906, 910-15 (1985); Note, Liability, supra note 65, at 224; Note,
Opportunity Knocks, supra note 12, at 263; Annotation, Financial Inability of Corporation to Take
Advantage of Business Opportunity as Affecting Determination Whether "Corporate Opportunity" Was
Presented, 16 A.L.R.4TH 185 (1982).
148. 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935).
149. Id. at 124; accord Brudney, Insider Securities Dealings During Corporate Crises, 61 MIcH.
L. REv. 1, 25 (1962).
150. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsh, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied sub nom. Biddle v.
Irving Trust Co., 294 U.S. 708 (1935); eg., Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 82 N.C. App. 470, 472,
346 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1986) (fiduciary drained the corporate funds into other corporations that he
controlled).
151. Since management typically selects from a set of financially feasible business options, the
financial feasibility of developing this particular opportunity is not conclusive evidence that the cor-
poration actually would have developed it.
152. See Morad v. Coupounas, 361 So. 2d 6, 9 (Ala. 1978); Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 4
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cence may be attributable to the speculation and cumbersome evidence needed
for such calculations.
The courts' analysis of financial ability is indirect and gross, but is less spec-
ulative and demands less burdensome evidentiary requirements. They equate
financial ability with corporate solvency, reasoning that an insolvent corporation
could not pursue this (or any other) opportunity. 153 One court, for example,
found that the corporation's cash flow problems and clearly precarious financial
condition were insufficient to substantiate financial inability; corporate insol-
vency was required.1 54 Because insolvency is such a gross measure of financial
inability, using it as the standard also gives the corporation the benefit of the
doubt that it is financially able to pursue the opportunity.
ElIzey v. Fyr-Pouf, Inc.155 further illustrates the relevance and determina-
tion of corporate insolvency. A fiduciary acquired a lease, bought equipment,
and started a business in competition with the corporation. The Supreme Court
of Mississippi emphasized that the corporation's solvency and financial capacity
was a requisite element of the complainant's case.15 6 It explained, however, that
there are different types of insolvency: insolvency in a balance sheet sense, tem-
porary insolvency in the equity sense, and solvency with an inability to obtain
credit because of a lack of liquidity.15 7 The court selected balance sheet insol-
vency as the appropriate test of financial inability, apparently because it was the
most serious and unalterable condition.158 The court responded to the policy
concern that the fiduciaries might manipulate the corporation's financial condi-
tion by refusing to deem the corporation disabled if the disability was caused by
fiduciaries not paying their debts to the corporation or otherwise breaching their
duty.159
3. Business Practicality
A third type of incapacity arises when internal or external business obsta-
cles preclude the corporation from pursuing the opportunity. Internal con-
straints include the corporate management's inability to incorporate the
opportunity into its existing production, marketing, personnel, or other func-
Haw. App. 359, 367-69, 667 P.2d 804, 812-13 (1983); Lowder v. All Star Farms, Inc., 82 N.C. App.
470, 472, 346 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1986).
153. CST, Inc. v. Mark, 360 Pa. Super. 303, 309, 520 A.2d 469, 472 (1987); Nicholson v. Evans,
642 P.2d 727, 731-32 (Utah 1982).
154. CST, 360 Pa. Super. at 309-10, 520 A.2d at 472.
155. 376 So. 2d 1328 (Miss. 1979).
156. Id. at 1331. The complainant also had to prove that the opportunity had a logical relation-
ship or was essential to the corporation. Id. at 1333. If the complainant was able to carry its burden
of proof, then the burden shifted to the fiduciaries, who had to prove that they acted diligently and in
good faith. Id. at 1332-35. This analysis is a version of the Miller two-step test, described supra text
accompanying notes 100-117.
157. Ellzey, 376 So. 2d at 1334.
158. Id.
159. Id. Fiduciaries generally may borrow from their corporation, although the transactions are
subject to fairness standards and may require director or shareholder approvals. See, eg., N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§ 714, 719(a)(4), 1317(a)(1), 1320 (McKinney 1986). Considering these loans, prior to
their maturity, as part of the corporate coffers for purposes of determining financial ability, could
imply that the corporation has a claim to what are technically the fiduciaries' personal funds.
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tions. 160 For example, a computer software company may want to pursue the
development of a new line of software but may not have the computer specialists
to perform the necessary research and development or may not have appropriate
distribution channels because their existing product line is targeted at a different
market. A professional service corporation of medical doctors may want to pur-
sue a service contract with a local hospital, but the physicians may not have
sufficient time to perform the contract.1 6 1 These internal constraints may be
surmountable, but at a cost that yields an unacceptable return on the invest-
ment. Thus, the opportunity effectively offers no practical benefit for the corpo-
ration, although the corporation technically has the financial resources to pursue
it.
The corporation may also be precluded from pursuing the opportunity by
external constraints. These constraints are largely market and industry condi-
tions that create difficult barriers to the corporation's exploitation of the oppor-
tunity.1 62 They include a market already dominated by other corporations with
economies of scale, buyers who are doggedly loyal to existing competitors and
their brands, or substantial difficulty in finding adequate and predictable
suppliers.
Of the possible corporate incapacities, these internal and external business
obstacles are arguably the most relevant in predicting whether the corporation
actually would have, rather than merely could have, exploited the opportu-
nity. 163 To presume the corporation would have pursued the opportunity if
given the chance, just because the opportunity as developed by the fiduciaries
turns out to be profitable, is mere speculation. A business practicality test that
evaluates realistic business and market constraints, along with the opportunity's
financial feasibility and return on investment, more accurately reflects actual
corporate decision making. The courts nevertheless generally have rejected this
analysis, presumably because of traditional judicial hesitation to speculate on
management decisions and corporate strategy.: 4
Courts have addressed but have not resolved the business impracticality
that occurs when the party controlling the opportunity is unwilling to pursue the
opportunity with the corporation. In five cases in which the fiduciaries argued
the unwillingness of a third party as a defense, only the court in Peterson Weld-
ing Supply Co., v. Cryogas Products, Inc. 165 found the argument persuasive. 166
160. See, eg., Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physicans, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 236 S.E.2d 460 (1985).
161. See Quinn, 254 Ga. at 219, 326 S.E.2d at 464 (doctors' unavailability to perform the con-
tract was an insufficient defense if the fiduciaries in part caused the inability).
162. Eg., Peterson Welding Supply Co., v. Cryogas Prods., Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 759, 762, 467
N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (1984) (area retail distributers would not do business with plaintiff, a wholesale
retailer). The fiduciaries also are likely to face the same obstacles in their development of the
opportunity.
163. See M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES
AND COMPETITORS 3-33 (1980); M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUS-
TAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 1-33, 445-535 (1985).
164. See cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 165-86.
165. 126 Ill. App. 3d 759, 467 N.E.2d 1068 (1984).
166. Id. at 764, 467 N.E.2d at 1070.
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The discussion which follows briefly reviews the five cases and offers a basis on
which to distinguish them.
In the first two cases, Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk 167 and Lindenhurst
Drugs, Inc. v. Becker,16 8 the fiduciaries were asked to negotiate on behalf of their
corporations leases for the corporations' businesses. The lessors declined to
grant the leases to the corporations. The fiduciaries subsequently negotiated the
leases on their own behalf. Although there was no evidence that the fiduciaries
undermined the corporations' interests during negotiations, the courts nonethe-
less believed that the fiduciaries could not have exercised their best efforts be-
cause of their own interests in the opportunities. 169
In the third case, Energy Resources Corp., Inc v. Porter,170 the fiduciary
was a vice president and chief scientist trying to obtain a research project on
behalf of his nonminority corporation. The project required the fiduciary's spe-
cialized expertise. Howard University, the institution offering the project, ex-
pressed to the fiduciary, who was black, that, consistent with the University's
policy goals, the recipient of the project would be a minority business. The fidu-
ciary reported to the corporation, "We're not going to get [the project]."' 7 1 The
fiduciary subsequently resigned, started his own business, and obtained the pro-
ject. The court found that Howard University's unwillingness to grant the pro-
ject to the corporation was an insufficient defense because the fiduciary had not
made a full disclosure to the corporation. 172 The court reasoned that without
full disclosure, the corporation would not know of the third party's refusal to
deal with them and therefore would not have the option of taking some action to
change the third party's position.173 Moreover, it would be "too difficult to ver-
ify the unwillingness to deal and too easy for the executive to induce the unwill-
ingness."' 74 Full disclosure requires that the corporation know of the
opportunity, of the third party's refusal to deal with the corporation, have a fair
statement of the reasons for that refusal, and, by implication, know of the fiduci-
ary's intention to pursue the opportunity personally. 7 5 As the court stated, "A
fiduciary's silence is equivalent to a stranger's lie."' 76
Production Finishing Corp. v. Shields 177 likewise rejected the fiduciary's
third party refusal defense because the fiduciary did not make a full disclosure.
At the fiduciary's instigation the corporation sought a major steel polishing con-
167. 145 III. App. 3d 355, 495 N.E.2d 1006 (1986).
168. 154 Ill. App. 3d 61, 506 N.E.2d 645 (1987).
169. Comedy Cottage, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 361,495 N.E.2d at 1012; Lindenhurst, 154 Ill. App. 3d
at 70, 506 N.E.2d at 651-52.
170. 14 Mass. App. CL 296, 438 N.E.2d 391 (1982).
171. Id. at 305, 438 N.E.2d at 395.
172. Id. at 305, 438 N.E.2d at 395. For a discussion of the effect of disclosure or nondisclosure
in resolving corporate opportunity disputes, see infra text accompanying notes 226-32.
173. Id. at 300, 438 N.E.2d at 394.
174. Id. at 300-01, 438 N.E.2d at 394.
175. Id. at 302, 438 N.E.2d at 395
176. Id. at 304, 438 N.E.2d at 396 (Brown, J. concurring).
177. 158 Mich. App. 479, 405 N.W.2d 171 (1987) (citing Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14
Mass. App. Ct. 296, 438 N.E.2d 391 (1982)).
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tract with Ford Motor Company. The fiduciary, while negotiating on the corpo-
ration's behalf, learned that Ford refused to grant the contract to the
corporation. Ford's reason was that the corporation would have a monopoly if
it received the business, and that this would be disadvantageous to Ford's gen-
eral bargaining position. Without disclosing Ford's refusal or his own personal
interests, the fiduciary then pursued the contract on his own behalf.
Unlike the other four cases, Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cyrogas Prod-
ucts, Inc. 178 found the third party's refusal defense persuasive.17 9 A retail dis-
tributor of industrial gases and equipment sought a wholesale distributorship of
the same products, but the grantor was adamant that the distributorship be
given to a business that operated only on a wholesale level. This requirement
was based on a feasibility study indicating that Chicago retail distributors would
not buy from a combined retail-wholesale operation.180 A fiduciary of the retail
operation subsequently sought and obtained the distributorship on his own be-
half. Plaintiff corporation apparently knew of the grantor's demands but never-
theless argued that the fiduciary did not "take all steps necessary to obtain the
opportunity" for the corporation.181 Under the circumstances, the court con-
cluded that the fiduciary did not breach his duty to the corporation. 182
The result of the Peterson case reflects sound judicial reasoning. To give the
corporation a proprietary claim to an opportunity that it could not otherwise
obtain is inefficient and contrary to the corporation's and fiduciaries' reasonable
expectations. The fiduciary was well suited, because of his particular experience,
to develop the opportunity successfully. At the same time, the third-party gran-
tor identified the fiduciary as a party with whom it was interested in working.
Precluding the fiduciary's exploitation of the opportunity would force the third
party to spend further time and effort locating another qualified party. More-
over, the result in Peterson respects the third party's freedom to contract with
whomever it wishes, so long as the parties do not violate existing obligations.
The result also accommodates policy concerns regarding the fiduciaries'
and corporation's efforts to change the third party's position. The grantor's rea-
son for refusing to do business with the corporation-it was not commercially
feasible to grant the distributorship to a retailer-was independent of and could
not be influenced by the actions of the fiduciary or the corporation. Short of
completely disregarding its current operations and moving into an exclusive
wholesale operation-and there was no indication that the corporation was will-
ing to take this drastic action-the corporation's basic retail character consti-
tuted a bar to the opportunity.
The third party's reasons for refusal can be analyzed similarly in the other
four cases. The lessor's refusal in Comedy Cottage and Lindenhurst to lease to
178. 126 Ill. App. 3d 759, 467 N.E.2d 1068 (1984).
179. Id. at 764, 467 N.E. 2d at 1072.
180. Id. While the corporation could have questioned the credibility and conclusiveness of this
or any feasibility study, it is unlikely that the corporation could have swayed the grantor. The
grantor apparently was convinced that the study was correct. See id.
181. Id. at 763, 467 N.E.2d at 1072.
182. Id. at 764, 467 N.E.2d at 1072.
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the corporation apparently was based on a subjective preference between lessee
candidates.18 3 The lessor's preferences may have been alterable by the fiducia-
ries' or the corporation's efforts. Thus, the courts rejection of the third party
defense seems justified.
The results of the two other cases, particularly Production Finishing, are not
as easily justified under this reasoning. The facts given in the Energy Resources
opinion do not make clear whether Howard University's requirement that the
bid go to a minority business was alterable. 184 As the opinion suggested, the
corporation might have been able to ease the university's concerns. 185 In addi-
tion, the corporation conceivably could have become a minority-run business.
For example, the corporation could have arranged for the fiduciary, a minority
person, to share in the profits from the project, or could have set up a separate
corporation in which the fiduciary owned a majority interest and the corpora-
tion a minority interest, or could even have assisted the fiduciary in setting up
his own corporation which, in turn, would have subcontracted the project back
to the corporation. There were, however, no indications that the corporation
would have been receptive to these proposals.
In Production Finishing, Ford's reason for refusing to award the contract to
the corporation-that the corporation would consequently have a monopoly-
was probably unalterable.' 8 6 An unrelated competitor might have been enticed
to enter the market and thus could have prevented the corporation from ob-
taining a monopolistic position. It is improbable, however, that the corporation
would have supported or exerted any efforts toward attracting a competitor and
ensuring the competitor a share of its existing market, even if it meant that those
actions would have resulted in its winning the Ford contract. Hence, the court's
rejection of Ford's refusal to deal with the corporation as a defense, unjustifiably
restricted Ford's freedom to contract and failed to recognize the efficiency bene-
fits of the fiduciary exploiting an opportunity that the corporation probably
could not have exploited.
C. Corporate Expectations Model
Some modern courts are gravitating toward a corporate opportunity model
that is actually a revival of the traditional Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co.
expectancy test.' 8 7 They view the doctrine as one that merely carries out the
183. See Lindenhurst, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 70-71, 506 N.E.2d at 652; Comedy Cottage, 145 Ill.
App. 3d at 358, 495 N.E.2d at 1009.
184. See Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 300, 438 N.E.2d 391, 395
(1982).
185. Id.
186. See 158 Mich. App. at 488-89, 405 N.W.2d at 173. If the corporation was the only business
available to perform the services, however, Ford would be forced to do business with it or to con-
tinue to do the work internally.
187. Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900); see supra text
accompanying notes 83-89. Courts differ on the significance of whether the opportunity was within
the corporation's expectancy. They may regard it as one of two independently sufficient bases for
finding liability, as the only sufficient basis, or as merely a relevant factor among other considera-
tions. See, e.g., In re Safety Int'l Inc., 775 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 1985) (requiring expectancy and
financial ability); Three G Corp. v. Daddis, 714 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring
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corporation's original intentions and justifiable expectations. If, at the outset of
their relationship, the corporation and the fiduciaries do not expressly negotiate
the ownership of opportunities of interest to both, then the courts project what
the corporation probably would have agreed to if the issue had been raised.18 8
While adhering to this general notion of reasonable expectations, the courts
differ widely on what constitutes the general parameters of the corporation's
hypothetical original bargain.' 8 9 Some define the corporation's proprietary in-
terest in business opportunities narrowly. They reserve to the corporation only
those opportunities to which it has an express contractual right, essentially pat-
terning its reasoning after Lagarde's expectancy test. 190
Other courts have endowed the corporation with a proprietary interest in
all business opportunities with which it has had some prior dealings. For exam-
ple, the corporation's attempt to obtain a lease919 or to renew a lease' 92 has been
held to result in protectable expectancies.193 Some courts go further, endowing
the corporation with a protectable expectancy even if it has not taken any ac-
tions regarding the opportunity. One court took into consideration
the fact that directors had undertaken to negotiate in the field on be-
half of the corporation, or that the corporation was in need of the par-
ticular business opportunity to the knowledge of the directors, or that
the business opportunity was seized and developed at the expense, and
with the facilities of the corporation. . .. 194
Under these more expansive views of the corporation's rights, fiduciaries may
not pursue an opportunity once the corporation has shown an interest in an
opportunity, particularly if it is an opportunity that the corporation needs.
Georgia cases exemplify the use of a corporate expectations model. Begin-
ning with the landmark case of Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary Engineer-
ing Corp.,195 the Georgia Supreme Court introduced a moderate view of the
corporation's rights that evolved into a more restrictive approach in subsequent
cases. In McCrary the corporation was an engineering firm specializing in mu-
either expectancy or the hindrance of the corporate purpose); Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk, 145 Ill.
App. 3d 355, 360, 495 N.E.2d 1006, 1011 (1986) (requiring expectancy and the hindrance of the
corporate purpose); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (requiring expec-
tancy and that the opportunity be essential); Poling Transp. Corp. v. A & P Tanker Corp., 84
A.D.2d 796, 796, 443 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (1981) (mere.) (requiring expectancy).
188. See, e.g., United Seal and Rubber Co. v. Bunting, 248 Ga. 814, 815, 285 S.E.2d 721, 722
(1982); Southeast Eng'g Consultants v. McCrary Eng'g Corp., 246 Ga. 503, 273 S.E.2d 112 (1980);
Lindenhurst, 154 Ill App. 3d 61, 506 N.E.2d 645 (1987); Comedy Cottage, 145 Ill. App. 3d 355, 495
N.E.2d 1006 (1986).
189. See, e.g., Three G Corp. , 714 P.2d at 1336 (corporation's financial inability takes opportu-
nity out of corporation's expectations).
190. See, eg., United Seal, 248 Ga. at 815, 285 S.E.2d 722.
191. Lindenhurst, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 63, 506 N.E.2d at 650.
192. Comedy Cottage, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 360, 495 N.E.2d at 1011.
193. See Lindenhurst, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 68, 506 N.E.2d at 650; Comedy Cottage, 145 Il. App.
3d at 360, 495 N.E.2d at 1011.
194. Gauger v. Hintz, 262 Wis. 333, 351, 55 N.W.2d 426, 436 (1952) (quoting 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 861.1 (rev. penn. ed. 1975)).
195. 246 Ga. 503, 273 S.E.2d 112 (1980); see Note, Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary




nicipal water and sewage projects. The president of the corporation started his
own competing business, using the corporation's equipment, offices, and person-
nel in his business operations over a three-year period. Prior to the president's
departure from the corporation, the corporation entered into a contract with a
municipality for a preliminary study as part of the competition for a large mu-
nicipal project. After the president's departure, his own company also competed
actively for the large project. The corporation argued that the ex-president
should be prevented from competing for the project because it was an opportu-
nity that belonged to the corporation. 19 6
In applying the Georgia statute regarding business opportunities, 197 the
court began by citing Miller v. Miller as providing the applicable test, but pro-
ceeded to adopt a significant modification to Miller.198 Miller used a line of
business test as the first step and a fairness test as the second step. 199 In deter-
mining whether former officers have usurped opportunities belonging to the cor-
poration, the McCrary court instead inquired whether the corporation had an
expectancy to the opportunity.20° Only after determining that a corporation
had an expectancy was it necessary to determine if the fiduciary breached his
duty by taking the opportunity.20 1 The court in effect changed the first step in
the Miller test from a line of business test to an expectancy test.202
By emphasizing that this change was applicable only to former fiduciaries,
the court distinguished between former fiduciaries to whom the expectancy test
would now apply and current fiduciaries to whom the line of business test would
apparently continue to apply.203 This distinction is especially significant be-
196. McCrary, 246 Ga. at 504, 273 S.E.2d at 114.
197. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-153(a)(1)(c) (1982) (originally codified at GA. STAT. ANN. § 22-
714 (1968)). Georgia appears to be the only state with a statute that expressly addresses the corpo-
rate opportunity issue. While some courts cite a New York statute, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 720
(McKinney 1986 Supp. 1988), as providing a statutory basis for a violation of a corporate opportu-
nity duty, that statute does not expressly refer to corporate opportunities. The contribution of the
Georgia statute is unclear because the corporate opportunity cause of action existed under common
law, and the statute does not define or clarify the test for determining liability. The statute reads:
Actions against directors and officers. (a) An action may be brought by any of the persons
named in subsection (b) of this Code section against one or more directors or officers of a
corporation to procure for the benefit of the corporation a judgment for the following re-
lief:
(1) To compel the defendant to account for his official conduct or to decree any other
relief called for by his official conduct in the following cases:...
(c) The appropriation, in violation of his duties, of any business opportunity of the
corporation; ....
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-153(a)(1)(c) (emphasis added).
Appropriate plaintiffs include the corporation, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, officer, director,
judgment creditor, or shareholder in a derivative action. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-153(b) (1982). The
applicable statute of limitations is four years from the time the cause of action accrued, although it is
unclear when the running of the statute of limitations period begins. Id. § 14-2-153(c).
198. McCrary, 246 Ga. at 507-08, 273 S.E.2d at 117.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 98-115 for a discussion of the Miller test.
200. McCrary, 246 Ga. at 509, 273 S.E.2d at 117.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 92 for a discussion of how outcomes differ depending
on whether a line of business test or expectancy test is used.
203. McCrary, 246 Ga. at 509 n.2, 273 S.E.2d at 117 n.2.
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cause the court, unlike most other courts, astutely recognized that the applica-
tion of the line of business test effectively precluded all fiduciaries from
competing against the corporation. 204 While this may be an appropriate prohi-
bition for existing fiduciaries, the court concluded that it was inappropriate for
fiduciaries who had left the corporation. 205 It was not entirely clear, however,
why the defendant was deemed to be a former rather than a current fiduciary for
purposes of determining the appropriate test. The court apparently reasoned
that the appropriate time to determine the fiduciary's status was at the time the
fiduciary began to compete actively. 20 6 Although the legal creation of a com-
pany may be an indication of active competition, it is not determinative. Be-
cause the fiduciary actively competed for the project after he had left the
corporation, the court considered him a former fiduciary. 207
Applying the expectancy test, the court found that the corporation had a
protectable expectancy in the opportunity because of its prior dealings; the op-
portunity was one in which the corporation had a "beachhead. '208 Further-
more, as required by the second step in the analysis, the court found that the
fiduciary acted unfairly and breached his duty by setting up the competing busi-
ness, using the corporation's resources, and hiring away the corporation's
employees. 209
While other courts have defined the corporation's expectancy as ranging
from only opportunities supported by a binding contractual claim to all opportu-
nities in which the corporation has an interest, 210 the court in McCrary took a
moderate view of the corporation's rights. Although the corporation had previ-
ously negotiated for the project, the city was not committed to award it the job.
Nevertheless, the corporation was one of several final contenders, and the court
presumed that the corporation's active competition for the project was a suffi-
cient basis for its reasonable expectation in the project. 211
Although this holding represents a moderate view of the corporation's ex-
pectations, its practical impact on the fiduciary was probably drastic. The cor-
poration was actively competing for twenty-two projects, including the one at
issue in the case, at the time the fiduciary left the corporation. The court's hold-
ing most likely ended any intention the defendants may have had to pursue any
of the remaining projects since, under the reasoning of the case, these projects
were within the corporation's expectancy. Under the reasonable assumption
that these projects constituted much if not all of the available business that the
fiduciaries' new company could pursue in the foreseeable future, the denial of all
204. Id. at 509, 273 S.E.2d at 117; see supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
205. McCrary, 246 Ga. at 509 n.2, 273 S.E.2d at 117 n.2.
206. See id.
207. See id. The court indicated, however, that even if the fiduciary was deemed to be a current
fiduciary, and hence the line of business test would be applicable, the result would be the same. Id.
208. Id. at 509, 273 S.E.2d at 117.
209. See id. at 509-10, 273 S.E.2d at 117-18.
210. See, eg., United Seal & Rubber Co. v. Bunting, 248 Ga. 814, 815, 285 S.E.2d 721, 722
(1982) (contractual relationship required).
211. See id., at 509, 273 S.E.2d at 118.
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of these projects most probably ended the fiduciaries' venture.2 12
A series of subsequent Georgia Supreme Court cases interpreted more nar-
rowly the opportunities to which the corporation had an expectation. In United
Seal & Rubber Co. v. Bunting2 13 the corporation sold gaskets, seals, and rubber
products in the southeastern United States. Three directors and officers left the
corporation to start a competing business, eventually attracting customers that
represented approximately fifty percent of the corporation's gross income.2 14
Applying the expectancy test, the court found that the corporation had no pro-
tectable expectancy to the customers since no contractual relationship of exclu-
sivity governed their relationship. 215 Although they were major and long-
standing customers, theirs was still an "ongoing relationship with no finite
aspect." '2 16
The United Seal court distinguished McCrary as dealing with a specific
contract and a finite project.2 17 This distinction, however, may be overstated.
While a contract existed in McCrary, it was only for a nonexclusive preliminary
study and did not commit the municipality to any further relationship with the
corporation. Thus, it was evidence of the corporation's prior interest and deal-
ings but was not a legally enforceable contractual claim to the opportunity. In
addition, the contract in McCrary was only one of many that the corporation
was pursuing, which makes it analogous to the "ongoing relationship[s] with no
finite aspect" customer relationships in United Seal.218
Two years later in Sofate ofAmerica, Inc. v. Brown 2 19 the corporation again
contested a former fiduciary's taking of key customers. Following the analysis
in United Seal, the court required a contractual relationship prior to finding that
the corporation had an expectancy to the customers. 220 In Singer v. Habif,
Arogeti & Wynne, P.C,221 a case decided in the same year as United Seal, the
court took an even narrower view of the rights of professional corporations,
finding that a professional corporation of accountants had no expectancy to re-
tain existing clients.222 Even though the professional corporation had engage-
ment letters with the clients, the letters did not prohibit the clients from leaving.
Clients' use of professional services, the Singer court offered in dictum, are ter-
minable at will. 223 In United Seal, Sofate, and Singer the court's determination
that the corporation had no protectable expectancy resulted in the finding of
nonliability.
212. Id. at 504, 273 S.E.2d at 114.
213. 248 Ga. 814, 285 S.E.2d 721 (1982).
214. Id. at 815, 285 S.E.2d at 722.
215. Id. at 816, 285 S.E.2d at 723.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See also id. at 817-18, 285 S.E.2d at 724 (Weltner, J., dissenting) (concluding that a long-
standing customer relationship is a protectable business opportunity).
219. 171 Ga. App. 39, 318 S.E.2d 771 (1984).
220. Id. at 43, 297 S.E.2d at 776.
221. 250 Ga. 376, 297 S.E.2d 473 (1982).
222. Id. at 377, 297 S.E.2d at 475.
223. Id. at 379, 297 S.E.2d at 476 (dictum).
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In general, these courts conjectured that if the corporation had anticipated
the corporate opportunity dispute at the outset of its relationship with the fiduci-
ary, it would have agreed that the corporation should be entitled to only those
opportunities to which it had a contractually based claim. Thus, these courts
applied the same expectancy test used in Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co.,
despite its several problems.224 The test does not enhance the integrity of the
corporate-fiduciary relationship because it puts the fiduciaries in an inherently
awkward position. Furthermore, the expectancy model in general, at least as it
is currently applied, considers only the corporation's expectations, even though
an accurate assessment of the hypothetical understanding between the corpora-
tion and fiduciaries regarding corporate opportunities does not seem possible
without considering the fiduciaries' expectations. 225
D. Disclosure Model
The trend in some recent cases is to require disclosure to the corporation by
the fiduciary prior to pursuing an opportunity. 226 A disclosure model essen-
tially allows the corporation to exercise a variation of a right of first refusal on
opportunities that the fiduciary must disclose.2 2 7 If the traditional line of busi-
ness test is used to determine which opportunities the fiduciaries must disclose,
the fiduciaries will be required to reveal all opportunities that may be in compe-
tition with the corporation or to which the corporation may theoretically adapt
its resources. The corporation thus would be afforded its pick of a broad range
of opportunities, although it may still have to compete with third parties for the
opportunities.
The disclosure model has certain advantages and disadvantages. Requiring
fiduciaries to disclose all opportunities in which the corporation may have an
interest clearly protects the corporation. Corporations can monitor the fiducia-
224. 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900); see supra text accompanying notes 84-93.
225. In contrast to this general tendency in cases adopting a corporate expectations model, the
court in Levitt v. Leisure Sports Inc., 734 P.2d 1221 (Nev. 1987), did consider the entire bargain. Id.
at 1225. The Nevada Supreme Court found that a fiduciary in a hotel and resort development
business did not take an opportunity belonging to the corporation. Id. The court emphasized that
the fiduciary's actions were consistent with a contingency plan that the parties had agreed to with
full appreciation of its possibly harsh consequences. Id.
226. See, e.g., Carlsted v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 86C 1927, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 1986) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file); Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 4 Haw. App. 359, 368-69, 667 P.2d 804,
813 (1983); Hill v. Hill, 279 Pa. Super. 154, 163, 420 A.2d 1078, 1082 (1980) (allowing fiduciary to
take opportunity only if opportunity known to shareholders, shareholders consent to the taking, and
such taking does not harm corporation); Imperial Group, Inc. v. Scholnick, 709 S.W.2d 358, 363
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730-31 (Utah 1982) (requiring that fiduci-
ary disclose opportunity to corporation and disinterested directors, or shareholders decline the op-
portunity). But cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934) (precluding the
fiduciaries from using the opportunity even if the corporation rejects it), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708
(1935).
227. In a typical right of first refusal, the party possessing the opportunity (offeror) would have
an obligation to offer the opportunity to a certain party (e.g., the corporation) before giving the
opportunity to a third party. Here, the fiduciaries are the third parties who want to pursue the
opportunity but cannot unless they first offer the opportunity to the corporation. Since the fiducia-
ries do not possess the opportunity, they cannot ensure the corporation receives the opportunity,
only that they will no longer compete for it.
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ries' loyalty because the fiduciaries effectively would be informing the corpora-
tion when they were considering a business activity that might result in a conflict
of interest. The corporation also can decide, in light of its business strategy and
an assessment of the opportunity's anticipated return on investment, whether it
will pursue the opportunity. Retrospective speculation about whether the cor-
poration would have developed the opportunity would be preempted. 228
In addition, in theory, if the disclosure process is clearly delineated, corpo-
rations, fiduciaries, and courts can also readily determine the fiduciaries' compli-
ance with the process. Because courts can objectively measure whether the
fiduciaries have made an adequate disclosure and whether the corporation has
validly rejected or accepted the opportunity, this model offers an advantage over
the other more subjective models and traditional tests.
The courts that have used the disclosure model, however, have not clearly
delineated the process. Unresolved issues include such fundamental topics as
when disclosure is required, who is obligated to disclose, to whom disclosure
must be made, and exactly what information must be disclosed. Furthermore, if
the disclosure process mandates numerous steps and has detailed procedural re-
quirements, 229 then compliance with the process may be laborious for both the
corporation and the fiduciaries. At the same time, the number of individuals
subject to the disclosure process may be expanding.2 30 If courts require disclo-
sure of all opportunities in the corporation's line of business, the administrative
costs of a laborious process multiply.
While we should not overlook these administrative concerns, the courts
presumably will address and gradually resolve these issues so that the process is
reasonably efficient. A more fundamental problem that affects how these admin-
istrative issues will be resolved is that it does not explicitly consider
noncorporate interests. This inadequacy is revealed in at least two significant
ways.
First, in answering such basic questions as which opportunities must be
disclosed and when fiduciaries must disclose them, courts do not acknowledge
the hardships and concerns of the fiduciaries. Any disclosure requirement that
forces fiduciaries to reveal their personal professional plans infringes on their
right to keep their plans confidential. All employees should provide reasonable
notice of their departure to the corporation, but this disclosure ordinarily occurs
closer to the time of departure than when disclosure is currently envisioned
under the disclosure models. Premature disclosure of one's future plans can
negatively affect work relationships and the transition process for the fiduciaries'
replacement. It also can jeopardize the opportunity to which the fiduciaries may
be rightfully entitled. Disclosure requirements should strike a more just balance
between the corporation's legitimate right to know of certain opportunities and
the fiduciaries' legitimate right to confidentiality.
228. See supra text accompanying note 134-41.
229. For example, the American Law Institute (ALI) proposes a detailed disclosure process
discussed infra text accompanying notes 237-49.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
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Second, the model's inadequacy is also revealed by its imposition of disclo-
sure obligations solely upon the fiduciaries. Imposing disclosure or notice re-
quirements on the corporation could yield a more efficient process. For
example, as previously discussed, it is currently unclear who is subject to the
corporate opportunity doctrine.231 Key employees, for example, are sometimes
subject to the doctrine although they do not have the title of director or officer;
therefore, they would not have prior notice of their duties to disclose. In addi-
tion, as discussed below, it is frequently unclear which opportunities are subject
to disclosure. 232 Consequently, fiduciaries are placed in an ambiguous position.
One resolution of these problems would be to impose a duty of disclosure on the
corporation. As part of that duty, the corporation could be required to notify
those individuals it believes are subject to the corporate opportunity doctrine
and to indicate which opportunities in particular or in general those individuals
are obligated to disclose. By imposing duties on both parties, the disclosure
model would enforce the corporate opportunity doctrine in a manner more con-
sistent with the basic understanding and reasonable expectations of the corpora-
tion and fiduciaries.
Disclosure requirements do not reflect the reasonable expectations of the
parties if the process is undefined and if unilateral obligations are imposed on the
fiduciaries. An undefined disclosure process creates administrative burdens on
both the corporation and the fiduciaries and infringes unnecessarily and improp-
erly on the rights of the fiduciaries. On the other hand, a disclosure process
which is clearly defined and includes mutual disclosure obligations is desirable,
allowing the parties to know in advance the type of opportunities that are sub-
ject to disclosure. Thus, the corporation can be assured that fiduciaries will not
pursue impermissible opportunities without first following the disclosure proce-
dures and fiduciaries can determine whether to pursue a particular opportunity
on the basis of their disclosure obligations.
1. Fiduciaries' Conduct
The fiduciaries' duty to disclose an opportunity theoretically arises only
when two conditions are met:233 first, the opportunity is one that presumptively
belongs to the corporation; and second, the fiduciaries wish to pursue that op-
portunity.234 Although the fiduciaries know whether they wish to pursue the
opportunity, determining whether the opportunity belongs to the corporation is
often confusing and difficult. Individuals may not only be uncertain about
which opportunities presumptively belong to the corporation, they may even be
231. See supra text accompanying note 47.
232. See infra text accompanying notes 245-57.
233. Although there may not be a duty to disclose, the fiduciaries are still subject to a duty of
care if they are delegated to pursue the opportunity on behalf of the corporation. See Science Acces-
sories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957 (Del. 1980); ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(a)
comment.
234. Science Accessories Corp., 425 A.2d at 964. But cf. Imperial Group, Inc. v. Scholnick, 709
S.W.2d 358, 367 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting that fiduciaries may have an affirmative duty to
disclose an opportunity even if the fiduciaries do not wish to pursue it).
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unaware that they are fiduciaries and thus should be concerned about deciding
who has rights to the opportunity.2
35
Fiduciaries who are in doubt about whether or not an opportunity is subject
to the disclosure process likely will follow one of three options.2 36 First, out of a
sense of caution, the fiduciaries may disclose the opportunity if there is the
slightest reason to believe that it may be appropriate to do so. This course of
action gives the corporation the most protection, but adds to administrative
costs. Second, to avoid the administrative burdens, the fiduciaries may simply
drop the idea altogether. The opportunity, therefore, may never be developed.
Third, after some consideration of whether the opportunity belongs to the cor-
poration, the fiduciaries may take their chances that it does not. They may go
forward with the opportunity with hopes that the corporation will never raise
the issue of the propriety of their actions. This course of action encourages an
undesirable circumvention of the disclosure process and the corporate opportu-
nity doctrine.
Courts adopting a disclosure model, therefore, should clearly explain when
an opportunity presumptively belongs to the corporation and hence must be dis-
closed. The American Law Institute (ALI) offers a delineation of opportunities
that must be disclosed.237 As part of the ALI disclosure process, 238 as depicted
in Figure 2, these opportunities include (1) activities that fiduciaries discover in
connection with their corporate performance or that the fiduciaries reasonably
believe they are offered because of their corporate capacities, 239 (2) opportuni-
ties the fiduciaries learn of through the use of corporate resources if the fiducia-
ries reasonably expect the opportunity to be of interest to the corporation,24° or
(3) opportunities that the fiduciaries know or should reasonably know are
closely related to the corporation's business.2 4 1 Despite this delineation, the
ALI acknowledges that the fiduciaries could still be uncertain whether an oppor-
tunity meets the criteria. 242 If the fiduciaries do not comply with their duty to
disclose because they believe that the opportunity is not a corporate opportunity,
they haye a second chance to follow the disclosure steps.24 3 In addition, the
235. See supra text accompanying note 47; see also supra text accompanying notes 120-23 (dis-
cussing confusion in corporate opportunity case principles).
236. Considering the confused state of the law, fiduciaries' lawyers will not be able to give defini-
tive advice. See, eg., Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 396, 438 N.E.2d
391, 396 (1982) (Brown, J. concurring) (criticizing attorney's advise to defendant on avoiding a
corporate opportunity violation). The most cautious recommendation always would be to disclose
fully the opportunity.
237. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(b). Fiduciaries have a reasonable duty to inquire if they
are uncertain whether the person offering the opportunity expects them to offer it to the corporation.
Id. § 5.05(b) comment c, illustration 1, 2, 4.
238. d.
239. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(b)(1)(A).
240. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(b) comment, illustration 4. For a corporate opportunity to
exist, the taking of the opportunity need not be harmful to the corporation. Id § 5.05(b)(1)(A)
comment.
241. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(b)(2). The ALI imposes a less burdensome duty on
outside directors, requiring disclosure only of those opportunities described in items (1) and (2). Id
§§ 5.05(a) comment b, illustration 1.
242. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05.
243. ALI Draft, supra note 25, §§ 5.05(d), (d) comment.
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corporation may make prior agreements with the fiduciaries regarding the dis-
closure and taking of corporate opportunities. 244
Once the duty to disclose arises, the fiduciaries must make an adequate
disclosure to the corporation.245 Although few courts elaborate on what consti-
tutes an adequate disclosure, the authorities that have commented on the subject
require that the fiduciaries make a full disclosure of both the opportunity and
the fiduciaries' possible personal interest in the opportunity.246 Analogizing to
the securities laws, the ALI2 4 7 and Klinicki v. Lundgren 24 8 impose a "material-
ity" standard. They require that fiduciaries disclose all facts which reasonable
persons would be substantially likely to consider important in their decision
making.249
Oregon has adopted a disclosure model and is the first state to endorse the
ALI's disclosure process. The Oregon Supreme Court in Klinicki held that a
fiduciary's establishment of a competing business based on a key contract for
charter flights usurped an opportunity belonging to the corporation.250 Origi-
nally negotiating the contract for the corporation, the fiduciary subsequently
pursued it on his personal behalf without disclosing his interest to the corpora-
tion. Because the fiduciary's conduct was not in compliance with the ALI's
disclosure process, he breached his fiduciary duty.25 '
In the context of a statute of limitations question, a second Oregon case,
Sabre Farms Inc. v. Jordan,25 2 elaborated upon what constitutes adequate dis-
closure.2 5 3 The fiduciaries informed the directors that a competing potato farm-
244. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analyis and Recommendations § 5.09(d) & comment
(Tent. Draft No. 7, April 10, 1987) [hereinafter ALI Draft No. 7].
245. It is not always clear to whom the fiduciary must make a disclosure. Although these issues
would need to be resolved in both closely- and publicly-held corporations, the administrative
problems would be exacerbated in large public corporations. For example, General Motors may
have 200 plants with 20 key employees at each one in addition to the executive staff at headquarters.
Do all 4000 or more individuals report every opportunity to the directors? It is unclear if disclosure
to the fiduciaries' immediate superior would suffice or if the fiduciaries must disclose to the body
with authority to consent to the fiduciaries' taking of the opportunity.
246. See Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 301 n.2, 438 N.E.2d 391, 394
n.2 (1982); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Or. 662, 683, 695 P.2d 906, 920 (1985) (en banc); Sabre
Farms, Inc. v. Jordan, 78 Or. App. 323, 326, 717 P.2d 156, 159 (1986); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d
727, 730-31 (Utah 1982); ALI Draft, supra note 25, §§ 5.05(a), 1.09.
247. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 1.20 (derived from TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438
(1976)).
248. 298 Or. 662, 695 P.2d 906 (1985).
249. See id. at 681-82, 695 P.2d at 919-20; ALI Draft supra note 25, § 1.20 (derived from TSC
Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
250. Klinicki, 298 Or. at 683-84, 695 P.2d at 920; see also Note, An Opportunity to Disclose, 22
WILLAMETrE L.J. 163 (1986) (discusses Klinicki and the effect of a corporation's financial inability
to pursue an opportunity on the corporate opportunity doctrine).
251. Klinicki, 298 Or. at 664-65, 695 P.2d at 908-09. The applicable Oregon law prior to
Klinicki is described in Zidell v. Zidell, 277 Or. 423, 560 P.2d 1091 (1977). The standard in Zidell
precluded fiduciaries from opportunities that would be pursued within corporate policy. Zidell, 277
Or. at 429, 560 P.2d at 1093-04. Although the tests in Zidell and Klinicki are different, the fiduciary
in Klinicki probably would have been held liable under either test.
252. 78 Or. App. 323, 717 P.2d 156 (1986).
253. The applicable two year statute of limitation begins to run when the plaintiff is aware of
every element of the corporate opportunity cause of action. OR. REV. STAT § 12-110(1) (1983). The
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ing operation was for sale, and that the fiduciaries had discussed with the seller
their interest in purchasing the business in their individual rather than corporate
capacities. 254 Six months later the fiduciaries disclosed to the directors that they
had entered into a memorandum of intent to make the purchase. The terms of
the agreement, however, were kept confidential pursuant to the parties' agree-
ment. The fiduciaries also explained to the directors that they intended to con-
vert the business to an industrial facility and thus actually benefit the financially
distressed corporation by removing a competitor.255 After discussion the disin-
terested directors voted unanimously to consent to the fiduciaries' taking of the
opportunity. In determining that the corporation had received adequate disclo-
sure of the information needed to make this decision despite the fact that the
terms of the purchase agreement were kept confidential, the court reasoned that
the corporation need not know "every fact." 256 "The disinterested directors
knew enough, actually or impliedly, to recognize the opportunity, if it was one,
and to determine both whether it was one the corporation should and could
attempt to take advantage of and whether Jordan and Reid [the fiduciaries] were
acting improperly. '25 7
While adequate disclosure may include disclosure of both the opportunity
and the fiduciaries' interest in it, the courts have only cursorily considered what
fiduciaries must reveal about their interest.2 58 The Klinicki court concluded
that the fiduciary's failure to disclose his intent to appropriate the opportunity
for himself was, in conjunction with 'other facts, a violation of his duty.259 Other
courts have implied that the fiduciaries should disclose their self-interest in the
opportunity.260 Energy Resources also required that when the party offering the
opportunity is unwilling to work with the corporation, then the fiduciaries must
"unambiguously disclose that refusal to the corporation.., together with a fair
statement of the reasons for that refusal."'26 1
2. Corporation's Response
Following the fiduciaries' disclosure, the corporation has three options. It
may decide to pursue the opportunity itself, to reject the opportunity and con-
decision regarding the opportunity, so that the limitations period had not yet begun. Sabre Farms,
78 Or. App. at 328-29, 717 P.2d at 159.
254. Sabre Farms, 78 Or. App. at 325-26, 717 P.2d at 157-58.
255. Id. at 326, 717 P.2d at 158. This conversion apparently never occurred.
256. Id. at 329, 717 P.2d at 159 (citing Duncan v. Auger, 62 Or. App. 250, 255, 661 P.2d 83, 86
(1983)).
257. Id. at 329, 717 P.2d at 159-60.
258. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 1.09. The ALI draft does not elaborate on what constitutes a
conflict of interest other than to require that the fiduciary disclose the "material facts" concerning
the conflict of interest. Id.
259. Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Or. 662, 683, 695 P.2d 906, 920 (1985); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 250-51.
260. See Sabre Farms, 78 Or. App. at 329, 717 P.2d at 160 (noting defendants' disclosure of their
personal interest in concluding that there was adequate disclosure); Energy Resources Corp. v.
Porter, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 300-01, 438 N.E.2d 391, 394 (1982) (criticizing the defendant for
being secretive about his reasons for leaving the corporation).
261. Energy Resources, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 302, 438 N.E.2d at 395.
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sent to the fiduciaries' pursuit of it, or to delay or abstain from any action. The
courts vary in what constitutes corporate acceptance, rejection, or abstention,
and the consequences of each.262
Some courts require that the corporation clearly manifest its decision. 263
For example, in Farber v. Servan Land Co. ,26 the shareholders on several occa-
sions discussed whether to acquire the land adjacent to the corporation's golf
course and country club. The minutes of their 1968 annual meeting stated:
"The stockholders seem to feel that this possibility should certainly be investi-
gated and would be made financially feasible by the refinancing." 265 The share-
holders, however, took no formal action and the corporation made no
investigation. About a year later, a fiduciary purchased the land in his individ-
ual capacity. Emphasizing that a specific commitment to purchase would have
been premature at the 1968 meeting, and that the fiduciary was the only director
active in the business, the court held that the shareholders' inaction was not a
rejection of the opportunity.266
At least one court does not require formal corporate action, but instead
inferred the corporation's rejection and consent from the circumstances. 267 In
Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Ina, for example, the fiduciary advised the corpora-
tion at a shareholders' meeting of an opportunity to acquire land appropriate for
commercial development.268 The court concluded that the fiduciary had dis-
closed the opportunity, and that the shareholders' inaction on the opportunity,
including their failure to object to the fiduciary's subsequent acquisition of the
land, constituted implied consent. 269
262. See Klinicki, 298 Or. at 682 n.13, 695 P.2d at 920 n.13 (1985) (indicating that an acceptance
is invalid if it does not meet the ALI standards for formal directors' and shareholders' authorization;
if the corporate acceptance is invalid the fiduciaries may take the opportunity only if the taking is
fair to the corporation).
263. See, eg., Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker, 154 Ill. App. 3d 61, 70, 506 N.E.2d 645, 651
(1987); Imperial Group, Inc. v. Scholnick, 709 S.W.2d 358, 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). For instance,
without formal corporate action, the corporation's knowledge of both the opportunity and the fiduci-
aries' interest in it would not constitute corporate consent. See CST, Inc. v. Mark, 360 Pa. Super.
303, 309, 520 A.2d 469, 471-72 (1987) (without formal request for and receipt of corporate permis-
sion, fiduciary could not accept business opportunity for himself). Although the cases rarely address
the issue, corporate acceptance may be unclear. Can acceptance be inferred, for example, or must it
be authorized by formal action? Further, if acceptance is inferred, does the corporation retain its
priority interest to the opportunity if it takes no steps to pursue the opportunity, or does the oppor-
tunity revert back to the fiduciaries after a certain lapse of time? To allow the corporation to retain
its priority position for an unreasonable period seems inefficient and unfair to the fiduciaries, particu-
larly if the fiduciaries also had legitimate rights to the opportunity.
264. 662 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1981).
265. Id. at 373.
266. Id. at 379.
267. See, eg., Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 4 Haw. App. 359, 369, 667 P.2d 804, 813 (1983).
268. From testimony of a shareholder:
Question: Did you think that there should have been a shareholder's meeting called?
Answer: I recall that we had one shareholders' meeting that Mr. Kainz stood up and said
to the shareholders that parcels 19 and 20, the option is running out and if we can come up
with the money then we should come up with it, otherwise he would go ahead with this
new company.
Id. at 369, 667 P.2d at 813.
269. Id.
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While the ALI provides a more detailed determination of corporate rejec-
tion than the cases, interpretational issues remain. The ALI states that the cor-
poration may reject the opportunity through a vote of disinterested directors.270
The directors' decision making would be subject to the standard of the business
judgment rule. 271 In addition shareholders may reject the opportunity272 if
their action does not constitute a waste of corporate assets.273
In addition to formal directors' or shareholders' rejection under the ALI,
the corporation apparently may impliedly reject an opportunity.274 First, courts
may infer a rejection from the circumstances. For example, the corporation's
failure to accept promptly the opportunity after the fiduciaries' disclosure may
constitute rejection. 275 Second, the directors' and shareholders' action may not
comply with the specific ALI standards for formal corporate action,276 but a
valid rejection may still be implied.
An implied rejection is valid, however, only if it is fair to the corpora-
tion.277 A rejection is fair if it complies with the standards used in evaluating
transactions between fiduciaries and the corporation. 278 It is unclear, however,
how courts will apply these standards. The standards emphasize whether the
transactions have terms comparable to those in an arm's-length transaction with
an unrelated third party.279 The corporation's rejection of the opportunity is
presumably fair if the corporation reasonably would have rejected the opportu-
nity if offered by an unrelated third party. This determination seems highly
speculative. In addition, some jurisdictions use a fairness test to resolve corpo-
rate opportunity disputes emphasizing a litany of factors dealing with the fiduci-
aries' conduct and the corporation's need for the opportunity.2 80 This approach
is markedly different from the fairness standard described above. This difference
in standards unfortunately may confuse rather than elucidate a determination of
what constitutes fair rejection.
The ALI also provides that the corporation may ratify28 1 the fiduciaries'
270. ALI Draft, supra note 25, §§ 5.05(a)(3)(B), 1.10.
271. ALI Draft, supra note 25, §§ 5.05(a)(3)(B).
272. ALI Draft, supra note 25, §§ 5.05(a)(3)(C), 1.11.
273. ALI Draft, supra note 25, §§ 5.05(a)(3)(C).
274. See ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(a)(3)(A) (this section does not require a formal rejec-
tion procedure).
275. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(a) comment, at 109; see also Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev.,
Inc., 4 Haw. App. 359, 399-70, 667 P.2d 804, 813 (1983) (shareholders' failure to object to fiduci-
ary's development of opportunity constitutes implied consent).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 270-73.
277. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(a)(3)(A).
278. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05 & comment; see id. § 5.02 (further discussion of fairness
standard). Neither § 5.05(a)(3)(A) nor the comments following define when a corporate rejection of
an opportunity is fair. The comment to § 5.05(a), however, indicates that it would be appropriate to
look to § 5.02 for guidance when there is a transaction between the fiduciary and the corporation.
Id. § 5.05(a) comment, at 109; see id. § 5.02(a)(2)(A) comment, at 33-34 (useful when defining fair-
ness as used in § 5.05 (a)(3)(A)).
279. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(a)(3)(A).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97 (discussion of fairness test used in corporate op-
portunity cases).
281. See supra note 25 (whether or not a corporation has accepted is not always clear).
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taking of the opportunity if such ratification occurs after full disclosure and
within a reasonable time after a suit challenging the taking of the opportunity is
filed.28 2 The corporation may ratify through either formal directors' or share-
holders' action.28 3
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: PARTIES' REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
This Article now explores an alternative to the traditional tests. Under this
alternative, courts would resolve corporate opportunity disputes according to
the expectations of the parties, as depicted in Figure 3.284 This approach is in
contrast to the traditional approach, which bases liability on the defendants'
fiduciary status and the protection of the corporate interest. This proposal also
differs from other expectation-related approaches, such as the Lagarde expec-
tancy test,285 the corporate expectations model,2 86 and a model offered by Brud-
ney and Clark.2 87 Those approaches misconstrue the corporate-fiduciary
282. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(c)-(d); see supra text accompanying notes 263-80 (stan-
dards and procedures for corporate rejection).
283. ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.05(c); see also Farber v. Servan Land Co., 662 F.2d 371, 379-
80 (5th Cir. 1981) (illustrating how a court may scrutinize ratification); In Re Safety Int'l, 775 F.2d
660, 662 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding informal ratification by defendant directors in their capacity as
shareholders because defendants owned 100% of corporate stock). In Farber, 662 F.2d 371, at the
1970 annual shareholders' meeting, a shareholder raised the subject of the fiduciary's earlier acquisi-
tion of the land parcel adjacent to the corporation's property. According to the corporate minutes,
the shareholders ratified the fiduciary's taking of the opportunity. Id at 373. The court nonetheless
questioned the ratification on two grounds. First, it queried whether the fiduciary's taking of the
opportunity was the type of act the corporation could legally ratify. Id. at 379. Because the Florida
courts had not indicated whether the shareholders could ratify a fiduciary's breach of duty, the
Farber court left this query unresolved. Id. Second, the court found that even if shareholder ratifi-
cation was possible, interested directors, acting in their shareholders capacity, may not ratify their
own acts. Id. at 380. Thus, the fiduciary's voting of his shares, which constituted a majority of the
stock, invalidated the ratification. Id.
284. Other disciplines have structured theories around parties' expectations. The economic the-
ory of rational expectations posits that parties make economic decisions, particularly ones regarding
pricing, in a rational and intelligent manner. At the time of the decision, they take into account all
past, present, and anticipated future events and relevant information. For further discussion, see G.
SHAW, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS: AN ELEMENTARY EXPOsITION 46-56 (1984); S. SHEFFRIN, RA-
TIONAL EXPECTATIONS (1983); Maddock & Carter, A Child's Guide to Rational Expectations, 20 J.
ECON. LIT. 39, 41-42 (1982).
The psychology theory of expectancy posits that individuals consider the relationship between
their efforts, performance, and outcome. For instance, the higher the expectancy that their efforts
will affect their actual performance, the higher the expectancy that their performance will affect the
ultimate outcome, and the higher the desirability of the outcome, the more motivation individuals
will have to initiate and sustain efforts to achieve the outcomes. E. LAWLER, PAY AND ORGANIZA-
TIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW 87-92, 101-116 (1971); Lawler & Suttle, Expec-
tancy Theory and Job Behavior, 9 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 482-87
(1973).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 184-225.
287. Brudney & Clark, supra note 2, at 1011. Professors Brudney and Clark, propose a model
they believe is consistent with the expectations of rational corporate entities. In closely held corpo-
rations, the model precludes the fiduciaries from pursuing an opportunity if: (1) the fiduciaries use
corporate assets to acquire or develop that opportunity, (2) the opportunity is "functionally related"
to the corporation's business and the fiduciaries have not obtained the corporation's consent, or
(3) the corporation has an "interest or expectancy" in the opportunity and the fiduciaries have not
obtained the corporation's consent. Id. at 1006. A "functionally related" opportunity is one in
which the operations, such as manufacturing or sales, overlap those of the corporation's, so that the
integration of the opportunity into the corporation would produce "non-trivial synergistic gains."
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relationship and how corporations operate. Furthermore, they consider the cor-
poration's interest predominant.
The proposed reasonable expectations test would protect the expectations
of both the corporation and fiduciaries. The expectations of the parties, how-
ever, are not always easily discernible. The optimal situation is when the parties
have an express agreement describing their expectations on the resolution of cor-
porate opportunity disputes. As discussed later, an express agreement has nu-
merous distinct advantages and should be encouraged. 28 8 Many corporations
and fiduciaries, however, currently do not execute express agreements on this
subject.289 In the absence of an express agreement, the next best choice is for
Id. at 1012. A corporation's expectancy is an amorphous concept that extends beyond contractually
based rights. Id. at 1013-16. If there is no corporate consent, there is a presumption that the oppor-
tunity is functionally related to the corporation and the corporation has an expectancy in it. Id. at
1013, 1016.
In publicly owned corporations, the model prohibits an outside director only from using corpo-
rate resources, including information, to develop or acquire an opportunity. Id. at 1044. The model
prohibits a full-time executive from taking any active business opportunities. Id. at 1023. By analo-
gizing full time executives to trustees, Brudney and Clark argue that this categorical rule is justified
because the shareholders of a public corporation cannot adequately select or monitor the "tendency
of officers to divert corporate assets." Id. In addition, the officers' compensation is sufficient to
induce their best efforts to the corporation, without adding covert compensation. Id.
These solutions pose a number of problems. First, the assumption that close corporations need
less protection than public corporations is unjustified. The argument for lesser protection for close
corporations is based on the presumption that fiduciaries in close corporations have a more consen-
sual relationship with the corporation. Id at 1003. It is as likely or more likely, however, that
fiduciaries of public corporations have carefully negotiated written agreements with the corporation.
See supra note 36. While the shareholders of public corporations do not directly negotiate with the
fiduciaries, the board and corporate executives and counsel are sophisticated at negotiating terms
that protect general corporate and shareholder interests. Shareholders already entrust these individ-
uals with negotiating the overall employment relationship with fiduciaries, of which the subject of
corporate opportunities should be a part. In addition, the diversion of a significant opportunity is
more likely to harm significantly a small, single-business close corporation than a large, diversified
public corporation.
Second, the categorical rule denying all business opportunities to full-time executives in public
corporations is an overbroad remedy. This result would be inconsistent with the corporation's and
the fiduciaries' reasonable expectations, which would envision a more balanced resolution. A cate-
gorical rule would be particularly surprising and unfair to fiduciaries with noncompetition covenants
who discover that compliance with the designated terms of that provision would not protect them
from being precluded from a competing business opportunity under the corporate opportunity doc-
trine. While Brudney and Clark predicate their rules on a trustee relationship, the parties are more
likely to characterize their relationship as one of agency. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
In addition, Brudney and Clark argue there are no "compelling" reasons not to apply a categorical
rule. Brudney & Clark, supra note 2, at 1028-30. They do not explicitly acknowledge significant
individual and societal interests, however, which as this Article documents, do offer "compelling"
reasons for a more balanced approach.
Finally, Brudney and Clark's distinction between full-time executives and outside directors is
questionable. Their model imposes fewer restrictions on outside directors because they are not
highly compensated. Id at 1042-43. The model also favors outside directors because of the belief
that they offer an independent and unbiased view that promotes proper conduct of the board. Thus,
the corporation's efforts at attracting these individuals to their boards of directors is a worthy goal.
Empirical studies, however, have discounted both of these rationales. A survey has indicated that
outside directors in large corporations receive an average generous compensation of $32,924 for each
directorship. HEwTT Assoc., supra note 37, at 5-6. Other research finds that the presence of
outside directors on boards actually increases the probability of illegalities. Gautschi & Jones, Ille-
gal Corporate Behavior and Corporate Board Structure, in 9 RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PER-
FORMANCE AND VALUES, supra note 34, 93.
288. See infra text accompanying notes 332-39.
289. See supra note 36.
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FIGURE 3. PARTIES' REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
FOLLOW
Expectations of Expectations of
corporation fiduciaries
Corporation is likely Fiduciaries are likely Fiduciaries' interests
to negotiate terms to negotiate terms coincide with
that protect the that protect their societal interests in
integrity of the rights to compete promoting
corporate-fiduciary and to start new competition and
relationship and its businesses, entrepreneurship.
competitive
position.
Determination of Specific Expectations
1. Context of overall relationship
2. Principles in Maryland Metals
3. Express agreement
the courts to follow the reasonable expectations of the parties if they had negoti-
ated the issue at the outset of their relationship.
While this process inherently includes some speculation, courts can use
guidelines to ensure that the outcomes are generally predictable. First, the
courts should begin with an understanding of the basic relationship between the
corporation and fiduciaries. Analogizing current fiduciaries to trustees or even
to the historically rigid fiduciary role is outdated. As previously discussed, the
corporate-fiduciary relationship is more analogous to an agency, employee, or
partnership relationship where the duties and rights of both parties are recog-
nized and flexibly negotiated. 290 The courts should respect their understanding.
Furthermore, if the parties had negotiated a corporate opportunity provi-
sion, they would have been in positions to negotiate terms in their own best
interests. Their relative parity29 1 helps ensure that the agreement fairly accom-
modates the corporation's and the fiduciaries' interests. The corporation would
negotiate terms that protect the integrity of the corporate-fiduciary relationship
and the corporation's competitive position. The fiduciaries would negotiate
terms that protect their right to compete and to start new businesses. Society's
interest in promoting competition and entrepreneurship efficiently coincides
with the fiduciaries' interests. Thus, the agreement accommodates both corpo-
rate and noncorporate interests.
Other guidelines for the courts are the principles set forth in Maryland Met-
als, Inc. v. Metzner.292 Maryland Metals is one of the exceptional cases where
290. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
291. To the extent courts apply the doctrine to lower level "key employees," these "fiduciaries"
may not be comparably sophisticated or be in parity with the corporation.
292. 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978).
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the court took the bold step of explicitly recognizing competing corporate and
noncorporate interests in a corporate opportunity dispute. The case does not
explore exactly how these interests are triggered, but it offers nonetheless a use-
ful initial framework on which to analyze properly these disputes.
A. Maryland Metals and Science Accessories
In Maryland Metals the Kerstein family had owned a scrap metals process-
ing business since the 1930S.293 Sidney Metzner joined the business in 1951,
played a key role in its development, and had risen to the position of executive
vice president. Metzner was asked to investigate a certain technologically ad-
vanced scrap processing machine know as a "shredder." Over seven years,
Metzner prepared several studies on the machinery and repeatedly recom-
mended that the corporation purchase it. The corporation, however, repeatedly
deferred any purchase.
In the fall of 1973 Metzner and Sellers, another key employee, approached
corporate president Kerstein about an equity interest in the corporation, or, in
the alternative, that they and the corporation form a new business using the
shredder. Kerstein denied their requests. Shortly thereafter, Metzner and Sell-
ers began actively preparing for their departure from the corporation and for the
establishment of a competing business. They contacted prospective investors,
met with various municipal agencies, applied for a loan, secured an option on a
piece of land, contracted to purchase a shredder, and took numerous steps to
prepare the site and equipment for business.294 The fiduciaries concealed all of
these preparatory steps from the corporation. In May 1974 the fiduciaries left
the corporation. The bank approved the loan, Metzner and his associate exer-
cised the option to purchase the land, and in March of the following year they
opened their business.295 The corporation subsequently claimed that the fiduci-
aries' conduct, including the starting of their new business, violated, among
other fiduciary duties, their duties under the corporate opportunity doctrine.296
These facts illustrate the interconnection of corporate, individual, and soci-
etal interests. The corporation had a legitimate interest in the integrity of the
corporate-fiduciary relationship. The corporation wanted to be able to trust the
fiduciaries with extensive business information and to feel that the fiduciaries
would carry out their executive decision making responsibilities with the corpo-
rate interest in mind. At the corporation's request, the fiduciaries gathered in-
formation on the shredder and prepared reports compiling their findings. The
corporation also had an interest in the business and profits that it would have
obtained if the fiduciaries had not started a competing business. 297
293. Id. at 33-35, 382 A.2d at 571.
294. Id at 43, 382 A.2d at 571.
295. Id. at 48, 382 A.2d at 573-74.
296. Id. at 37, 382 A.2d at 567.
297. The opportunity, however, was not unique; the corporation could buy a shredder if it
wished. Thus, the corporation could have improved its competitive position by buying its own
shredder and consequently could diminish the amount of alleged lost profits. The corporation, how-
ever, repeatedly declined to purchase the shredder; it apparently questioned the shredder's commer-
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The facts also illustrate individual and societal interests. For example, after
years of conscientious service as employees, the fiduciaries wanted an ownership
role in the corporation. When the corporation denied them that role, the fiduci-
aries proposed a joint venture with the corporation. Only when the corporation
also rejected that idea did the fiduciaries decide to pursue their entrepreneurial
interests through their own business. The fiduciaries were not motivated by a
desire to harm the corporation, but rather by a desire to develop a business that,
at least in part, belonged to them.
Furthermore, denying the opportunity to the fiduciaries would have drastic
consequences for the fiduciaries, especially Metzner. Because he had been with
the corporation for over twenty years, his knowledge and skills were probably
limited to the scrap metals processing business. Extrapolating these skills and
knowledge to a new industry would have been difficult; starting a new career in
another industry and developing the requisite new expertise would be costly and
disruptive.
Despite the existence of these noncorporate interests in Maryland Metals,
the traditional tests do not explicitly acknowledge or consider them. Under the
line of business test, for example, courts would simply preclude the fiduciaries
from the opportunity because the new company clearly was in competition with
the corporation. 298 Under the expectancy test, courts would find that the corpo-
ration's rights extend only to opportunities to which it has a contractual
claim.299 Because there was no such contract right, these courts would allow
the fiduciaries to pursue the opportunity. The emerging models also would not
acknowledge the noncorporate interests. The corporate capability model would
question the corporation's financial ability to develop the opportunity,3° ° while
the disclosure model would find the fiduciaries liable because they did not fully
disclose their intentions to the corporation.30 1
In contrast, Maryland Metals took a more balanced approach that reflects
sound judicial reasoning. In determining whether the fiduciaries breached their
duties either during or after their tenure with the corporation, the court inter-
wove discussions of the corporate opportunity doctrine and employment non-
competition laws.30 2 The decision began with an explicit recognition of
competing policy interests: the corporation's concern about the integrity of the
corporate-fiduciary relationship versus society's and the individual's interest in
fostering free competition.30 3 The court's accommodation of these competing
cial benefits and was concerned about the financial commitment the shredder would require. See id.
at 31, 382 A.2d at 566-67.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
300. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 226-30.
302. Maryland Metals, 282 Md. at 34, 382 A.2d at 566-67. The court's interweaving of the two
areas of law may cause some to question whether the court's articulation of noncorporate competing
interests was clearly intended to apply to the corporate opportunity doctrine. But see Science Acces-
sories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 962-63 (Del. 1980) (citing Maryland Metals as
directly applicable to a corporate opportunity dispute).
303. Maryland Metals reads:
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policy interests was consistent with employment noncompetition laws but was a
novel approach for the corporate opportunity doctrine.3° 4
In considering these competing interests, the court applied several princi-
ples. During their tenure, fiduciaries should fulfill their responsibilities dili-
gently and in good faith. 30 5 While they cannot actively and directly compete
with the corporation, fiduciaries have a privilege to prepare and to make ar-
rangements to compete with the corporation prior to their departure.30 6 This
privilege, however, is negated if they commit patently wrongful acts, 30 7 such as
fraud or misappropriation of the corporation's trade secrets or proprietary confi-
dential information.308 If fiduciaries do not commit these wrongful acts and
have not signed disclosure agreements, they have no obligation to disclose their
plans.309 To require disclosure of the details of their plans would render "prac-
tically meaningless" their privilege to prepare and would constitute an "unjusti-
fiable infringement" upon the individuals' right to select their employment and
an "undesirable impediment to free competition. '3 10
After their departure from the corporation, the court continued, fiduciaries
can compete actively.31 1 They can use the general expertise and knowledge ob-
tained from their corporate experience. 312 Although the fiduciaries' competing
Because corporate managerial personnel enjoy a high degree of trust and confidence in
performing their assigned functions, a potential exists for serious abuses of confidentiality
whenever personnel attempt to aggrandize their own economic interest at the expense of
the employer...
This concern for the integrity of the employment relationship has led courts to estab-
lish a rule that demands of a corporate officer or employee an undivided and unselfish
loyalty to the corporation.
Maryland Metals, 282 Md. at 37-38, 382 A.2d at 568.
Not limiting its analysis to this consideration the court continued:
The second policy recognized by the courts is that of safeguarding society's interest in
fostering free and vigorous competition in the economic sphere. Thus, as Judge
Openeimer stated for this court in Operations Research v. Davidson, 241 Md. 550, 575,
217 A.2d 375, 389 (1966): "[I]t is important to the free competition basic to our national
development as well as to the individual rights of employees who want to go into business
for themselves that their spirit of enterprise be not unduly hampered."
Id. at 38-39, 382 A.2d at 568-69.
304. Under employee noncompetition laws, in the absence of a covenant, employees can enter a
competing business upon termination of their employment. During their tenure, they may make
limited preparations for entering into such a business. See Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1135
(Wyo. 1985); Harty, Competition Between Employer and Employee: Drafting and Enforcing Restric-
tive Covenants in Employment Agreements, 35 DRAKE L. Rv. 261, 263-68 (1985-86); Rubin &
Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 LEGAL STUD. 93, 100 (1981). See gener-
ally Comment, Post Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 703,
705-06 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Post Employment] (discussion of reasonableness test of
post employment restraints); ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.06 comment g (providing that if fiducia-
ries are not found liable under the corporate opportunity model, they may not pursue the opportu-
nity if it violates the noncompetition rules).
305. Maryland Metals, 282 Md. at 38, 382 A.2d at 568.
306. Id. at 39-40, 382 A.2d at 568-69.
307. Id. at 44, 382 A.2d at 566.
308. Id. at 40, 44, 382 A.2d at 569, 572.
309. Id. at 40, 382 A.2d at 569.
310. Id at 47-48, 382 A.2d at 573.
311. Id. at 38, 382 A.2d at 568.
312. Id at 43, 48, 382 A.2d at 571, 573-74.
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enterprise may harm the corporation, their "business energy and initiative" after
they leave the corporation is "not synonymous with treachery" during their ten-
ure.3 13 Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the fidu-
ciaries did not breach their duties. 314
Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp.,315 a Delaware Supreme
Court case, cited with approval Maryland Metals' articulation of competing pol-
icy interests. 3 16 The corporation in Science Accessories manufactured digitizers,
electronic devices used in the computer graphics field. Defendants-one in
charge of the research and development and engineering departments, one a
chief engineer, and one a supervisor of manufacturing-were key employees
rather than traditional fiduciaries. 317 While employed at the corporation, de-
fendants learned of innovative technology conceived by a Dr. Alfred Brenner,
who was unrelated to the corporation. The commercial use of the technology
would produce a new product that would be more operationally reliable and less
expensive to manufacture than the digitizer which the corporation manufac-
tured-in short, a superior substitute product both to manufacture and to
use.
3 18
On their own time, off the corporation's premises, and without the use of
corporate materials, defendants built a working model of the new product.
While defendants did not use the corporation's materials for building the prod-
uct model, they did use about thirty dollars worth of materials and telephone
calls for activities related to the opportunity. It is unclear if the defendants, in
conjunction with Dr. Brenner, began production in their new company, Sum-
magraphics, during defendants' employment with the corporation. They clearly
took definitive steps toward the company's formation, including the limited cir-
culation of a prospectus prior to their departure.
Defendants apparently did not disclose the new product idea or any of their
activities to the corporation.3 19 The fiduciaries argued that they were subject to
a confidentiality agreement with Dr. Brenner, who did not want the corporation
to know or exploit this technology.320 In addition, the corporation was in poor
financial condition. The corporation argued that development of the new prod-
uct was a corporate opportunity and that the defendants' nondisclosure and pur-
suit of it constituted a breach of their fiduciary duty.321
In resolving the dispute, the Science Accessories court viewed the corporate
opportunity doctrine as an extension of agency principles, 322 indicating that the
principles are applicable not only to traditional fiduciaries but also to "key man-
313. Id. at 46, 382 A.2d at 572.
314. Id. at 48, 382 A.2d at 573-74.
315. 425 A.2d 957 (Del. 1980).
316. Id. at 963 (citing Maryland Metals, 282 Md. at 38, 382 A.2d at 568).
317. Id. at 960.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 964.
320. Id. at 962, 964.
321. Id. at 961-62.
322. Id.
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agerial personnel. '323 In determining whether defendants' conduct during their
corporate tenure violated their duty, the court followed the basic principle in
Maryland Metals: fiduciaries have the right to prepare to compete with their
corporation, so long as they have not committed such wrongful acts as misap-
propriation of proprietary information or premature solicitation of custom-
ers.324 Noting that defendants' conduct was "not above reproach," and
commenting in particular on defendants' unfavorable comparison in the new
company's prospectus of the corporation's product with the new company's
product,325 the court nonetheless found that the conduct was not of the egre-
gious nature that would invalidate the fiduciaries privilege to make business
preparations.326 The court instead permitted the corporation to assess costs
against defendants for their limited use of corporate materials and facilities, con-
cluding that there were no "actual" damages from any of defendants' other ac-
tivities. 327 Finally, because the defendants were not subject to noncompetition
covenants, they were free to compete actively with the corporation after their
corporate tenure.328
In determining whether defendants breached any duty by their nondisclo-
sure, the court emphasized the corporation's capabilities. 32 9 It found that Dr.
Brenner's unwillingness to disclose or work with the corporation and the corpo-
ration's poor financial condition were sufficient bases for concluding that the
opportunity was unavailable to the corporation and thus not one to which the
corporation had any priority rights.330 Because the opportunity did not belong
to the corporation, defendants had no disclosure obligations regarding it.331
The reasoning and conclusions of Maryland Metals and Science Accessories
323. Id. at 962. The court's opinion does not indicate whether the individuals had notice of their
fiduciary roles. If the corporation had expressly asked defendants to assume the traditional fiducia-
ries' positions or told defendants that their positions were of a fiduciary status, knowledge of the
potential restrictions on their entrepreneurial interests may have discouraged defendants from ac-
cepting the positions, encouraged them to renegotiate the terms of their employment, or prompted
them to consider quitting.
324. Id. at 965.
325. Id
326. Id.
327. Id. at 965, 967.
328. Id. at 965.
329. Id. at 963.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 964. Although the court did not articulate particular societal interests, several facts
may have influenced the decision. First, the fiduciaries wanted to commercialize a product based on
innovative and improved technology. The success of their venture, therefore, would not only in-
crease competition but also contribute a technologically improved and advanced product to the mar-
ketplace. Second, at the start-up stage fiduciaries are often more adept and successful at managing
and developing entrepreneurial projects than established corporations. In Science Accessories, the
fiduciaries' comparative advantage would seem especially pronounced because the corporation's fi.
nancial ability to pursue the opportunity was uncertain. See id. at 963. Because the corporation
generally was unwilling to develop ideas proposed by these fiduciaries, and the inventor of the new
product was unwilling to work with the corporation, the parties most receptive and committed to
developing the opportunity together were the fiduciaries and the inventor offering the opportunity.
See id. Third, the inventor's particular confidence in the fiduciaries gave the fiduciaries an advantage
over random third parties as well as the corporation. The fiduciaries also shared cumulative techni-
cal engineering and manufacturing knowledge and experience in the computer graphics industry that
put them in a select if not unique position.
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consider both corporate and noncorporate interests and are consistent with the
reasonable expectations of the parties. In the absence of an express and clearly
defined agreement, the principles of these cases offer appropriate guidelines for
resolving future disputes.
B. Resolving the Dispute Through Contract
An express agreement between the corporation and fiduciaries regarding
opportunities that may be of interest to both of them offers significant advan-
tages. 332 First, fiduciaries and the corporation commonly execute agreements
describing their respective obligations and rights. By including terms that ad-
dress corporate opportunities in their typical negotiating process, the parties
would provide a more comprehensive description of their understanding. As
knowledgeable parties with relative parity, they are likely to negotiate arrange-
ments that are efficient, fair, and address their major concerns.
In addition, a contract negotiated in anticipation of possible corporation
opportunity disputes allows the parties to reflect carefully about what a fair and
well-reasoned resolution would be. Courts currently try to resolve corporate
opportunity disputes after the fiduciaries have successfully developed the oppor-
tunity. At that point, fiduciaries have much to lose and the corporation has
much to gain. The high stakes may fuel emotions and blur memories of the
events leading to the dispute.
Moreover, an express agreement that is fairly negotiated and clearly deline-
ated enhances the integrity of the corporate-fiduciary relationship. The parties
do not have to speculate about what is expected of each; the certainty created by
the contract provides guidelines on which they can base their conduct. This
understanding allows the parties both to carry out their responsibilities without
unnecessary delays or ambiguities and to proceed with confidence, without hav-
ing to second-guess the other party's actions. Such an agreement lays the foun-
dation for a constructive and cooperative relationship. Advance and open
communication between the fiduciaries and corporation can prevent misunder-
standings, resentment, and disputes, and allows the parties to tailor creative pro-
visions. For example, specifying remedies that more accurately reflect the harm
incurred by the parties,3 33 instead of the all-or-nothing constructive trust rem-
edy, 334 may yield fairer treatment. Designing solutions that incorporate the in-
332. See ALI Draft No. 7, supra note 244, at § 5.09 (providing that corporations can establish a
policy and standards dealing with corporate opportunities). Although the corporation and fiducia-
ries may agree on noncompetition covenants, provisions regarding corporate opportunities per se
are highly unusual. This suggests that either the parties have an implicit agreement not disclosed in
their written agreement or they truly have no agreement on the issue. Rational expectation econo-
mists would argue that the parties do not make systematic errors. See supra note 284. Hence, they
must have an implicit agreement regarding corporate opportunities because completely ignoring the
issue would be a systematic error. One type of implicit agreement would be that, in light of unfore-
seeable future events, the parties would agree only to act in good faith and to deal fairly.
333. Under certain circumstances, for example, the fiduciaries may return the opportunity to the
corporation in exchange for a cash payment for their equity investment or the fiduciaries may keep
the opportunity but pay the corporation for any use of corporate resources and actual harm the
corporation incurred.
334. See supra text accompanying note 21.
1989]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
terests of both parties, such as jointly developing the opportunity,3 35 may offer
the most efficient and productive answer.
A contract should clearly delineate the parties' agreements in the following
areas:
336
(1) what opportunities are at issue;
(2) who is subject to the contract terms and for what specific
durations;
(3) the fiduciaries' disclosure requirements, including which opportu-
nities must be disclosed, when they must be disclosed, and to whom
they must be disclosed;
(4) the corporation's disclosure requirements (e.g., corporation's lines
of business) and obligations after the fiduciaries' disclosure (e.g., af-
firmative duties to investigate and pursue opportunities or to return
opportunity to fiduciaries);
(5) what constitutes corporate approval or rejection;
(6) existing or future opportunities to which either the corporation or
the fiduciaries are waiving their rights (e.g., opportunities in which the
fiduciaries have agreed to represent and bargain on behalf of the
corporation);
(7) relationship between any noncompetition covenants and provisions
dealing with corporate opportunity;337
335. The cases seem to presume that the only two options for developing an opportunity are
development by the corporation or development by the fiduciaries. In addition, however, an unre-
lated party could develop the opportunity, or it could not be developed at all. There is also the
possibility that the corporation and the fiduciaries could jointly develop the opportunity. They may
implement this joint development through a variety of arrangements. The fiduciaries could remain
with the corporation but independently manage the opportunity and share in its profits. Or the
fiduciaries may establish their own company, which then becomes a partner with the corporation in
a joint venture created specifically to develop the opportunity. Finally, the fiduciaries may establish
their own company in which the corporation invests or from which the corporation benefits in some
way, for example, as a licensee of the company's products, services, or technology.
336. While courts should generally enforce agreements in the corporate opportunity area, courts
may want to impose appropriate limits on their enforceability. One appropriate limitation may be
that the agreements are enforceable only if they are fair to the corporation's interest and do not
impose unreasonable burdens on the fiduciaries. Fairness to the corporation could be determined by
the following types of inquiries: (1) Viewed in its entirety, including the corporate opportunity pro-
visions, does the agreement between the corporation and the fiduciaries reflect a comparable ex-
change of value? (2) Is there reasonably foreseeable harm to the corporation or is such harm
outweighed by benefits that the corporation may reasonably expect? (3) Are shareholders' and direc-
tors' approval obtained or required? These inquiries are analogized from duty of loyalty principles
in conflict of interest cases. E.g., Schlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166
N.E.2d 793 (1960); ALI Draft, supra note 25, § 5.06 (regarding noncompetition rules). This ap-
proach would marry principles from the general duty of loyalty doctrine that protects the corpora-
tion's and shareholders' legitimate interests, to principles of employment noncompetition law3 that
consider individual and societal concerns; see supra note 304.
The careful scrutiny of employee noncompetition covenants is not appropriate here. A major
rationale for the careful scrutiny of employee noncompetition covenants is that employees are unso-
phisticated and in a disadvantageous bargaining position relative to the corporation so that terms are
more likely to be unfair to the employee. Comment, Post Employment, supra note 304, at 705-06.
This rationale is not descriptive of the typical corporate-fiduciary relationship, since both parties
tend to be comparably sophisticated and have relative parity in bargaining positions.
337. Employee noncompetition covenants are designed specifically to limit employees' access to
opportunities that are competitive with the corporation. While corporate opportunity provisions
likely will define "opportunities" to include competing opportunities, these provisions also may in-
clude noncompeting opportunities. For example, the parties may negotiate that fiduciaries must
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(8) possibility of cooperative or joint development of the opportunities
and under what circumstances such development would occur; and
3 38
(9) remedies for a violation of the agreement terms.3 39
As with all unchartered waters, corporations and fiduciaries may find it
difficult to navigate through their initial experiences in negotiating corporate
opportunity provisions. For example, the corporation may have difficulty in an-
ticipating the opportunities in which it may have a future interest. The corpora-
tion thus may negotiate its scope of interest in very general terms. While more
specific terms would better guide the parties, general provisions still offer evi-
dence of the parties' reasonable expectations. A second problem may occur in
close corporations where the fiduciaries themselves may be asked to determine
the corporation's policy on corporate opportunities. Their conduct and the con-
tents of the policy later may be scrutinized for a possible breach of their fiduci-
ary duties. The advantages of an express agreement, such as the enhancement of
the integrity of the corporate-fiduciary relationship, however, would appear to
outweigh these problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current corporate opportunity doctrine governs disputes between fiducia-
ries and the corporation that arise when the fiduciaries pursue business opportu-
nities that the corporation claims belong to it. These disputes trigger different
and often competing interests, such as the corporation's interest in the integrity
of the corporate-fiduciary relationship, the fiduciaries' interest in their ability to
compete with the corporation, and society's interest in promoting competition
and the starting of new businesses.
In resolving these disputes, the traditional tests explicitly consider only the
corporation's interests, ignoring competing individual and societal concerns. A
study of the cases of the last decade reveals three evolving models to resolve
these disputes: the corporate capability model, the corporate expectations
model, and the disclosure model. While these models have certain advantages,
they are inadequate because, like the traditional tests, they consider only the
corporation's interests.
The corporate opportunity doctrine can better reflect current policy con-
cerns if it explicitly considers the legitimate interests of individuals and society,
as well as of the corporation. This explicit recognition of competing interests, as
illustrated in a few exceptional cases, is consistent with the fundamental under-
standing and expectations of the corporation and its fiduciaries. The Article
recommends that the corporation and fiduciaries expressly negotiate the terms
under which they will resolve corporate opportunity disputes. This ensures that
the concerns of the corporation and the fiduciaries are addressed, while adding
disclose their interest in opportunities that are offered to the corporation and the corporation is
considering actively-even though the opportunities clearly are unrelated to the corporation's cur-
rent business activities.
338. See supra note 335.
339. See supra note 333.
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certainty to an area plagued by ambiguities and confusion. In the absence of an
express agreement, the courts should enforce the reasonable expectations of the
corporation and the fiduciaries.
